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REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT AS FINANCIAL-MARKET REGULATOR 
 
Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Lawmakers, prosecutors, homeowners, policymakers, investors, news 
media, scholars and other commentators have examined, litigated, and reported on 
numerous aspects of the 2008 Financial Crisis and the role that residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) played in that crisis. Big banks create RMBS 
by pooling mortgage notes into trusts and selling interests in those trusts as 
RMBS. Absent from prior work related to RMBS securitization is the tax 
treatment of RMBS mortgage-note pools and the critical role tax enforcement 
should play in ensuring the integrity of mortgage-note securitization. 
This Article is the first to examine federal tax aspects of RMBS mortgage-
note pools formed in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis. Tax law 
provides favorable tax treatment to real estate mortgage investment conduits 
(REMICs), a type of RMBS pool. To qualify for the favorable REMIC tax 
treatment, an RMBS pool must meet several requirements relating to the 
ownership and quality of mortgage notes. The practices of loan originators and 
RMBS organizers in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis jeopardize the tax 
classification of a significant portion of the RMBS pools. Nonetheless, the IRS 
appears to believe that there is no legal or policy basis for challenging REMIC 
classification of even the worst RMBS pools. This Article takes issue with the 
IRS’s inaction and presents both the legal and policy grounds for enforcing tax 
law by challenging the REMIC classification of at least the worst types of RMBS 
pools. The Article urges the IRS to take action, recognizing that its failure to 
police these arrangements prior to the Financial Crisis is partly to blame for the 
economic meltdown in 2008. The IRS’s continued failure to police RMBS 
arrangements provides latitude to industry participants, which facilitates future 
economic catastrophes. Even without the IRS taking action, private parties can 
rely upon the blueprint set forth in the Article to bring qui tam or whistleblower 
claims to accomplish the purposes of the REMIC rules and obtain the beneficial 
results that would occur if the IRS enforced the REMIC rules.   
                                                 
* Brad and David are Professors of Law at Brooklyn Law School. They thank Emily Berman, 
Anita Bernstein, Dana Brakman Reiser, Neil Cohen, Steve Dean, Ted Janger, Steve Landsman, 
and Alan Lederman for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. They also thank Orly 
Graber and Tobias Schad for excellent research assistance. © 2013 Bradley T. Borden & David J. 
Reiss. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
When real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs) operate in the 
Congressionally-sanctioned manner, they drive capital to residential real estate 
markets and help provide liquidity to all classes of homeowners. That capital 
makes homeownership a reality for people who may not otherwise be able to 
purchase a home and it also fuels economic growth. Unfortunately, in the years 
leading up to the 2008 Financial Crisis, REMIC sponsors disregarded 
Congressional mandates, labeling arrangements as “REMICs” even though they 
did not qualify for that label. REMIC organizers (including loan originators, 
underwriters, and sponsors) knowingly originated and pooled problematic 
mortgage notes to form residential-mortgage backed securities (RMBS). RMBS 
pools thus included mortgage notes signed by uninformed and unqualified 
borrowers with insufficient collateral to ensure repayment of the notes. Having 
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established these purported REMICs, the organizers then misrepresented their 
quality to investors.  
The practices of REMIC organizers were an integral part of financial 
debacle that brought the multi-trillion dollar real estate finance industry to its 
knees. In fact, the practices literally brought the U.S. Treasury to his knees as its 
Secretary, Hank Paulson, pled with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to keep her party 
on board with the 2008 federal government bailout designed to address the 
Financial Crisis.1 The practices also crippled the world economy. If the IRS had 
enforced the REMIC rules, it would have deterred the unsavory practices of 
REMIC organizers, which most likely would have help prevent or, at least,  
reduced the magnitude of the Financial Crisis. Now the IRS must take action to 
help clean up the mess and collect revenues to which the government is legally 
entitled. 
 REMICs are the result of mortgage securitization—the process of pooling 
illiquid assets, such as mortgage notes, into an RMBS pool (commonly a state-law 
trust) and selling securities in the pool to investors. The securitization process 
requires several steps. Loan originators, such as local banks, lend money in 
exchange for mortgage notes and mortgages. Loan originators then sell the 
mortgage notes and mortgages to an RMBS sponsor. The RMBS sponsor gathers 
hundreds of mortgage notes and mortgages from loan originators and transfers 
them to an RMBS trust in exchange for interests in the trust. The sponsor then 
sells the RMBS to investors. If an RMBS trust satisfies several requirements, it 
will be a REMIC and receive favorable tax treatment.2 
Congress designed the REMIC requirements to ensure that only high-
quality mortgage notes enter RMBS pools that seek REMIC classification. By 
failing to securitize only high-quality mortgage notes in REMICs, RMBS 
sponsors violated tax law on a wide scale. The IRS would have uncovered such 
violations if it had audited REMICs. Early detection of violations through tax 
enforcement would have deterred much of the behavior that is responsible for the 
Financial Crisis. The IRS’s failure to audit REMICs and enforce the REMIC rules 
thus allowed practices to deteriorate and was one of the causes of the Financial 
Crisis. Having missed that opportunity, the IRS should now take action by 
challenging the classification of at least certain types of REMICs. Such actions 
will add to government revenues, put mortgage securitizers on notice that they 
must comply with Congress’ mandates, re-establish the IRS’s role as an impartial 
enforcer of federal tax statutes, and guide the tax bar as it advises financial 
institutions about the requirements for REMICs. 
                                                 
1 Liz Wolgemuth, Hank Paulson: Kneeling Before Pelosi, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 26, 
2008), available at http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-inside-job/2008/09/26/hank-
paulson-kneeling-before-pelosi.  
2 See infra text accompanying notes 151-153. 
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The significant amount of litigation that followed the RMBS collapse has 
exposed a number of unsavory lending and securitization practices that led to the 
Financial Crisis.3 In these legal battles, banks and RMBS sponsors have found 
themselves in the crosshairs of not only RMBS investors and government 
agencies but also homeowners. Homeowners and borrowers fight foreclosure and 
bankruptcy claims in downstream litigation; RMBS investors and prosecutors sue 
RMBS sponsors in upstream litigation.4 In downstream litigation, homeowners 
challenge claims of parties who attempt to foreclose on property or bring a claim 
in bankruptcy. The results of downstream RMBS litigation are mixed both from a 
legal and contextual perspective. In some jurisdictions, courts rule in favor of 
homeowners and estop purported mortgage holders from foreclosing on property 
or participating in bankruptcy proceedings.5 In other jurisdictions, courts allow 
purported mortgage holders to proceed with foreclosures or participate in 
bankruptcy proceedings.6 States have also filed lawsuits against lenders and other 
financial institutions in the mortgage industry claiming unfair and otherwise 
inappropriate lending and foreclosure practices.7 The results of some of these 
actions appear in headlines reporting settlements between states and financial 
institutions that total many billions of dollars.8  
 In upstream RMBS litigation, RMBS investors sue for various types of 
wrongdoing on the part of financial institutions. Investors claim that financial 
institutions did not properly disclose their liability exposure, that mortgage 
securitizations did not proceed as represented in offering materials and required 
by pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs), and that RMBS sponsors 
misrepresented facts about the ownership and quality of pooled mortgages.9 Much 
                                                 
3 See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 
(2011). See also John M. Griffin & Gonzalo Maturana, Who Facilitated Misreporting in 
Securitized Loans? (Working Paper, April 20, 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256060 (examining prevalence of four misrepresentation indicators in 
private-label RMBS).  
4 REFinblog.com presents and summarizes both downstream and upstream litigation matters. 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
7 See, e.g., Complaint, New York v. J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, No. 451556/2012 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 
County Oct. 10, 2012) (filing by New York Attorney General against J.P. Morgan for fraudulent 
and deceptive acts in promoting and selling MBS); Press Release, Lender Processing Services, 
Inc., Lender Processing Services Announces Multi-State Attorneys General Settlement; 
Significant Civil Litigation Also Resolved (Jan. 31, 2013), available at 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/lender-processing-services-announces-multi-140000279.html 
(announcing LPS settlement over robo-signing allegations “with the attorneys general of 46 states 
and the District of Columbia”). 
8 See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, States Negotiate $26 Billion Agreement for 
Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES Feb. 8, 2012, at A1. 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 93-144. 
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of the upstream litigation is in its early stages but involves astronomical sums of 
money. Figure 1 summarizes the litigation landscape in this area. 
 
 
 
 The Financial Crisis has been written about from many angles, but this 
Article is the first to approach it from the perspective of tax policy. It illustrates 
that law and policy do not support REMIC classification of numerous RMBS 
pools. The Article suggests that had the IRS enforced statutory requirements for 
REMICs, it could have helped prevent the Financial Crisis. After analyzing 
multiple questions of first impression that the courts will face in resolving RMBS 
litigation, this Article concludes that even today the IRS could and should take 
action against REMICs that flagrantly violate the REMIC rules.  
Part II of the Article recounts the history of the RMBS industry and the 
role of REMIC classification in that industry. The discussion reveals that 
policymakers and commentators support mortgage-note securitization because it 
provides greater liquidity to residential mortgage lenders, reduces the cost of 
borrowing, and makes homeownership available to a broader cross-section of the 
population. Congress enacted the REMIC rules to facilitate mortgage 
securitization by providing tax-favored treatment to RMBS structures that 
satisfied several requirements. That favorable treatment was tailored to RMBS 
structures and securitization processes that were common at the time. Following 
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the enactment of the REMIC rules, however, lending and securitization practices 
began to change. Leading up to the Financial Crisis, those practices simply ceased 
to satisfy the applicable requirements. The result was disastrous. 
 Part III provides the legal basis for challenging the REMIC classification 
of many RMBS arrangements. A comparison of the rules of REMIC classification 
to actual securitization practices in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis 
reveals that many RMBS arrangements that held themselves out as REMICs 
could not satisfy the REMIC requirements. This analysis therefore discredits 
claims of commentators and government officials who argue that there are no 
good legal or policy reasons for challenging the tax classification of purported 
REMICs.10  
 Part IV presents the policy reasons for challenging REMIC classification. 
Congress enacted the REMIC rules to apply to a very specific type of mortgage-
note pool. The requirements are grounded in sound tax policy and the IRS should 
be duty-bound to enforce the rules. Granting favorable tax treatment to RMBS 
arrangements that fail to adhere to those rules undermines Congressional intent 
and the sound policy that supports the rules. Failure to enforce the rules allows 
parties to siphon significant tax revenue from government coffers. The failure to 
audit purported REMICs also empowered REMIC organizers to engage in 
practices that led to the Financial Crisis. Continued failure to act in this area will 
provide continued opportunities for such practices. IRS inaction also justifies the 
tax bar’s poor work in this area, making the call to action all the more urgent. The 
IRS has an obligation to act to thwart the type of behavior that brought the 
world’s economy to its knees. Part V concludes. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF RMBS INDUSTRY AND ROLE OF REMICS 
 
For generations, Americans who wanted to buy a home would typically 
contact a local thrift institution such as a savings and loan, or bank, and speak to a 
loan officer who would evaluate their applications. Reserve requirements and 
balance sheet restrictions limited the amount of money institutions could lend 
under these conditions.11 That system stifled growth by limiting the amount of 
cash available to lend to potential homeowners.12 Limited amounts of cash drive 
up interest rates, making homeownership available only to people with prime 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., Joshua Stein, Dirt Lawyers Versus Wall Street: A Different View, PROB. & PROP. 
(2013 forthcoming), available at 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0BxUYhg0cYUOTdjdSMXd3OWoyNGc/edit; John W. Rogers III, 
Tax Issues Involving Flawed Securitization, Slaes, Exchanges & Basis Committee Meeting, 
American Bar Association Section of Taxation, Orlando, Florida (Jan. 26, 2013). 
11 See JEROME F. FESTA, SECURITIZATIONS: LEGAL & REGULATORY ISSUES, Chapter 1 (2013).  
12 See id. 
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profiles.13 Thus, the traditional practice for financing home ownership needed 
innovation to make homeownership possible for a larger segment of society. The 
answer appeared to lie with Wall Street. 
 
A. Origins of the RMBS Market 
 
 Wall Street investors had historically viewed home loans as riskier 
investments than other assets because mortgages are regulated by a patchwork of 
local and state laws and are tied to local economies.14 A local recession or natural 
disaster could increase defaults and decrease the value of a portfolio of 
geographically concentrated mortgages. These conditions kept Wall Street 
investors out of the residential mortgage market. To help create more liquidity for 
lenders and homebuyers, the federal government began considering mortgage 
securitization as a possible source of greater liquidity in the late 1960s.15 
Securitizations are carefully structured to achieve precise tax, accounting, and 
regulatory treatment to make them attractive to such investors. To help reduce 
risks associated with local economies the pool of mortgages were drawn from 
diverse locations.16 Interests in these pools of mortgages are residential mortgage-
backed securities (RMBS).  
 The most important factor in the development of the RMBS market was 
the creation of two government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”): Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. While Fannie had created a secondary market for certain loans prior 
to 1970, the RMBS market began in earnest with the passage of the Emergency 
Home Finance Act of 1970 (EHFA), which allowed GSEs to purchase and 
securitize conforming mortgages. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac set up 
standardized procedures for the creation and management of RMBS pools, and 
guaranteed the timely payment of principal and interest on the securities backed 
by the loans in the pool.17 GSEs only securitized conforming loans, meaning they 
had to meet strict standards related to the borrower’s credit worthiness and the 
value of the collateral.18 
                                                 
13 See David J. Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending 
to Flourish in the Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 992-93 (2005). 
14 A part of the discussion of the history of RMBS derives from Reiss, supra note 13. 
15 Then Housing and Urban Development Secretary George Romney championed the mortgage 
securitization movement. See John C. Weicher, Setting GSE Policy Through Charters, Laws, and 
Regulation, in SERVING TWO MASTERS, YET OUT OF CONTROL: FANNIE MAE AND FREDDIE MAC 
120, 132 (Peter J. Wallison ed., 2001). 
16 See Reiss, supra note 13, at 1004. 
17 See David Reiss, The Federal Government's Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac's Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick up the Tab, 42 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1073 (2008). 
18 See id. at 1032. 
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Securitizations in the 1970s involved direct pass-through securities for 
which investors received a mortgage-note pool’s cash flow in proportion to their 
ownership of securities in the pool.19 Thus, a person who owned five percent of 
the pool’s securities would receive five percent of the cash flow from each 
mortgage and be taxed accordingly. In the late 1970s, “the primary condition” 
necessary for the explosion of RMBS securitization came about: “a funding 
shortfall.”20 That is, the strong desire for home ownership and the rapid escalation 
of housing prices created a demand for residential mortgages that the local 
lending institutions could not meet. Wall Street firms responded. 
 Starting sporadically in the late 1970s, issuers not related to the federal 
government such as commercial banks and mortgage companies began to issue 
RMBS. These “private label” securities do not have the governmental or quasi-
governmental guarantee that a federally related issuer, such as a GSE, would give, 
and they are typically backed by nonconforming loans. Private-label securitization 
gained momentum during the savings and loan crisis in the early 1980s. Wall 
Street firms identified “a unique opportunity to profit from the thrift crisis by 
proffering the securitization exit strategy as the solution to the thrifts’ residential 
portfolio dilemma.”21 Issuers of these private-label securities were less regulated 
and less consistent than Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac when it came to creating 
and managing their products. Nonetheless, private-label RMBS faced a serious 
impediment to their growth that arose from their tax treatment. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s the tax classification and treatment of 
the mortgage-note pools stymied the growth of the RMBS industry. RMBS 
sponsors could structure the mortgage-note pools as investment trusts, which 
required the mortgage-note pool to remain constant and the investors to have 
proportionate interests in the mortgages that equaled their proportionate interests 
in the trust.22 Consequently, the trust generally could issue only one class or type 
of security.23 If the RMBS pool was an investment trust, the interest income from 
the loans would flow through to the investors without the trust incurring any tax 
liability.24 The proportionate ownership requirement, however, prohibited the 
RMBS pool from issuing different classes (or tranches) of interests without 
                                                 
19 See JOHN FRANCIS HILSON & JEFFREY S. TURNER, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
TO SECURED FINANCING, § 2:6.2 (2000). 
20 See Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in American Finance, in A PRIMER ON 
SECURITIZATION , 1, 6 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 1996). 
21Id. 
22 See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c)(1) (Nov. 3, 1967). 
23 See id.  
24 See I.R.C. §§ 671–679. Tax law treats investment trusts as grantor trusts. See Treas. Reg. § 
1.671-2(e)(1), (3); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34347 (Sep. 14, 1970).  
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becoming a taxable entity.25 Thus, RMBS sponsors had to choose between a 
single tranche flow-through pool or a multiple-tranche taxable pool of mortgages.  
Leaving the tax drawbacks aside, the financial benefits of multiple-tranche 
mortgage-note pools are significant. A multiple-tranche mortgage-note pool 
creates RMBS interests with different risk profiles. For instance, the mortgage-
note pool over-collateralizes the highest rated tranche and pays the holders of that 
tranche first. If the trust has sufficient proceeds, it can pay the holders of all of the 
tranches. If borrowers begin to default, however, the trust may not be able to fully 
pay the obligations of all the tranches. The lower-rated tranches thus have higher 
risk and pay a higher rate of interest. The ability to provide tranches with different 
risk profiles make RMBS attractive to a broader swathe of investors and add more 
capital to the residential mortgage market. Most importantly, the least risky 
tranches were rated investment-grade by the rating agencies, making them eligible 
for purchase by a range of institutional investors.26 
As noted, the problem with the multiple-tranche RMBS structure was that 
it would not qualify for flow-through taxation.27 Consequently, a multiple-tranche 
RMBS trust would be a tax corporation and have to pay tax on interest it earned 
on loans;28 interests in such a trust might have been equity and not debt, so 
payments to holders might not have been deductible;29 and RMBS holders would 
have to pay tax on payments that they received.30 Thus, the tax aspects of multi-
tranche RMBS structures made them unattractive to investors. 
Congress was concerned about granting favorable tax treatment to 
multiple-tranche RMBS structures because cash inflows and outflows and interest 
income and deductions of such structures do not match.31 Because the risk profile 
and date to maturity of the different tranches vary, the interest rate for the various 
tranches varies, and the RMBS trust and the RMBS investors recognize interest 
income at different times under the rules governing original issue discount.32 Even 
if over time the income of RMBS holders and of the RMBS trust equalized, the 
                                                 
25 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 
1986 (H.R. 3838, 99th Cong.; P.L. 99-514) [hereinafter 1986 Bluebook] at 407. 
26 See generally STANDARD & POOR’S GUIDE TO CREDIT RATING ESSENTIALS (2011) available at 
http://img.en25.com/Web/StandardandPoors/SP_CreditRatingsGuide.pdf.  
27 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 25, at 407; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(c) (amended Dec. 17, 
1996) (“An ‘investment’ trust will not be classified as a trust if there is a power under the trust 
agreement to vary the investment of the certificate holders. . . . An investment trust with multiple 
cases of ownership interests ordinarily will be classified as a [corporation].”). 
28 See I.R.C. § 11(a) (imposing a tax on corporate income) (2012). 
29 See I.R.C. § 163(a) (allowing a deduction for interest payment, but no similar deduction exists 
for dividend payments). 
30 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7). 
31 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 25, at 412; Kirk Van Brunt, Tax Aspects of REMIC Residual 
Interests, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 154–156 (1994) (describing the mismatch). 
32 See Van Brunt, supra note 31, at 211–18. 
 
 
10                                    15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. ____ (forthcoming 2014)  
 
 
timing difference of that recognition could deprive the federal government of the 
time-value-of-money related to the delayed tax payments on the interest income 
of the junior tranche investors.33 Thus, Congress would only grant flow-through 
treatment to multiple-tranche RMBS trusts if it could solve that problem.  
Congress solved the problem with the REMIC rules by providing that 
REMICs must have only regular interests and residual interests.34 The regular 
interest holders must recognize interest income under the accrual method, taking 
into account any original issue discount in their interests.35 The residual interest 
holders, on the other hand, must recognize an amount of income (or loss) that is 
necessary to account for income not recognized by the regular interest holders 
(known as phantom income (or loss)).36 The holders of residual interests generally 
recognize phantom income early in the life of the RMBS trust and phantom loss 
in the later years.37 Even if the income and loss should offset each other, the 
timing difference gives residual interests negative value.38 To account for that 
income, an RMBS trust has to compute and estimate the performance of the loans 
on the formation of the RMBS trust, and the trust assets have to remain static 
throughout the life of the trust to give such computations and estimations 
meaning.39 Figure 2 illustrates why the interest of the RMBS trust does not match 
interest income of the RMBS investors. 
                                                 
33 See id. at 154–156, 184–185 (describing the timing difference). 
34 See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 25, at 412 (“Holders of ‘regular interests’ generally take into 
income that portion of the income of the REMIC that would be recognized by an accrual method 
holder of a debt instrument that had the same terms as the particular regular interest; holders of 
‘residual interests’ take into account all of the net income of the REMIC that is not take into 
account by the holders of the regular interests.”); Bruce Kayle, Where Has All the Income Gone? 
The Mysterious Relocation of Interest and Principal in Coupon Stripping and Related 
Transactions, 7 VA. TAX. REV. 303, 348 (1987) (“Holders of residual interests take into account 
the difference between the income generated by the REMIC’s assets and the amount of income 
taken into account by the holders of the regular interests . . . .”). 
35 See I.R.C § 860B(b) (requiring the use of the accrual method); § 1272(a)(6) (applying special 
accrual rules to regular interest investors). 
36 See I.R.C. §§ 860C(a), 860E(a) (requiring that the residual interest holder’s income be no less 
than the excess inclusion (“phantom income”) for the year). 
37 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
38 See Van Brunt, supra note 31, at 203. 
39 See I.R.C. § 1272(a)(6)(A) (providing that the daily accruals would derive in part from the 
present value of remaining payments under a debt instrument—either the RMBS or the mortgage 
note); Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(d)(2)(ii), (iii) (requiring a REMIC to report the following on the tax 
return for its first taxable year: information about the terms and conditions of the regular and 
residual interests and a description about the prepayment and reinvestment assumptions that the 
REMIC uses for purposes of I.R.C. § 1272); See 1986 Bluebook, supra note 25, at 426 (“Congress 
intended that such prepayment assumption will be determined by the assumed rate of prepayments 
on qualified mortgages held by the REMIC and also the assumed rate of earnings on the 
temporary investment of payments on such mortgages insofar as such rate of earnings would affect 
the timing of payments on regular interests. The Congress intended that the Treasure regulations 
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As part of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress provided that RMBS trusts 
that account for phantom income and loss are not subject to corporate taxation, 
but qualify for flow-through taxation.40 The static-asset requirement goes beyond 
merely limiting the transfer of mortgage notes into and out of the RMBS trust. It 
also supports a fairly accurate assessment of the value of the mortgage notes in 
the pool and the likelihood that the borrowers will make timely payments on the 
loans. Factors such as the creditworthiness of the borrower, the value of the 
collateral, the occupancy status of the collateral, and the trust’s right and ability to 
foreclose on the collateral affect the value of the mortgage notes and the 
likelihood and timeliness of payments.41 Consequently, Congress imposed strict 
requirements related to the trust assets that multi-tranche RMBS trusts must 
satisfy to qualify for REMIC flow-through treatment.42 RMBS trusts that fail to 
                                                                                                                                     
will require these pricing assumptions to be specified in the first partnership return filed by the 
REMIC.”). 
40 See I.R.C. § 860A. 
41 See, e.g., Griffin & Maturana, supra note 3 (identifying negative impact on payments of 
unreported second liens, inflated appraisals, misrepresentation of owner occupancy and flipping); 
State-Level Guarantee Fee Pricing: Notice, 77 Fed. Reg. 58991, 58991 (Sept. 25, 2012) (noting 
“the exceptionally high costs” incurred “in cases of mortgage default in” certain states). 
42 See I.R.C. §§ 860D, 860G; infra Part III. 
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satisfy these requirements cannot accurately compute the income of the RMBS 
holders and can siphon revenues from government coffers, if they use REMIC 
flow-through taxation.43 Consequently, any RMBS trust that neither meets the 
REMIC requirements nor is an investment trust must be taxed as a corporation.44 
Following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, multiple-tranche mortgage-note 
pools could elect the favored tax status of a REMIC if they satisfied the REMIC 
requirements. At the time Congress created the REMIC rules, RMBS sponsors 
appeared to take appropriate measures to ensure that they satisfied the REMIC 
requirements. REMIC status revolutionized the RMBS industry. Between 1986 
and 2008, REMICs became a significant part of the RMBS market. As of the end 
of 2011, purported REMICs held more than $3 trillion of assets.45 That value was 
about a quarter of all U.S. residential mortgages and a third of all securitized 
mortgages.46 
 A simplified version of the securitization process in 1986 illustrates how 
mortgage notes and mortgages moved to REMICs at the time Congress created 
the REMIC rules. First, an originator lent money to a borrower. The borrower 
signed a mortgage note for the amount of the loan and a mortgage granting the 
lender a security interest in the loan. As part of the first step, the lender recorded 
the mortgage with the county clerk.47 Second, the originator entered into a PSA 
with a sponsor and trustee. Pursuant to the agreement, the originator sold the 
mortgage note and mortgage to a REMIC sponsor for cash.48 If the mortgage note 
was a bearer instrument, the originator transferred it by transferring possession of 
the mortgage note, otherwise the originator indorsed the note and transferred 
possession of it.49 As part of the second step, the REMIC sponsor recorded the 
                                                 
43 For example, miscalculations may result in understated phantom income of the holders of 
residual interests. This could occur if the fair market value of the mortgage notes in the pool is less 
than the value that the RMBS organizers claim it is. The overstated value would result in the trust 
reporting less gross income than otherwise required under the rules governing original issue 
discount. That underreporting would understate the amount of phantom income that the residual-
interest holders would report in the early years of the RMBS. 
44 See I.R.C. § 7701(i) (treating taxable mortgage pools as tax corporations); 1986 Bluebook, supra 
note 25, at 411 (“The Congress believed that this vehicle should be the exclusive vehicle 
(accompanied by exclusive tax consequences) relating to the issuance of multiple class mortgage-
back securities, and that the availability of other vehicles should be limited to the extent 
possible.”). 
45 See Amended Complaint, Knights of Columbus v. The Bank of New York Mellon, No. 
651442/2011, at 36 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Aug. 16, 2011) (citing an April 27, 2011 Reuters 
report). 
46 See Federal Housing Finance Agency, Enterprise Share of Residential Mortgage Debt 
Outstanding, 1990-2010, available at http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=70 (Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheet). 
47 See generally 4 MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.28 (2013). 
48 See Reiss, supra note 13, at 1003 (describing securitization process). 
49 See WOLF, supra note 47, § 37.27. 
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transfer of the mortgage note and mortgage.50 Third, after the REMIC sponsor 
acquired a pool of mortgage notes and mortgages, it transferred them to a REMIC 
trust in exchange for the beneficial interests in the trust.51 The REMIC trust had 
no managers, so its trustee recorded the transfer of the mortgage note and 
mortgages with the county clerk.52 Fourth, the sponsor sold the beneficial interests 
in the REMIC trust to investors.53 Figure 3 illustrates the traditional RMBS 
securitization process from its inception in the 1970s until the 1990s. 
  
 
 
B. Mortgage Securitization with MERS 
 
The process of assigning mortgages had been universally cumbersome 
until the end of the 20th Century. Each assignment from originator to sponsor or 
from sponsor to mortgage-note pool would be recorded in the local land records 
where the property securing the mortgage loan was located. In the 1990s, industry 
players, including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the Mortgage Bankers 
Association, sought to streamline the process of assigning mortgages from the 
                                                 
50 See id. 
51 See FESTA, supra note 11, § 4.02. 
52 See JASON H.P. KRAVITT, SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 9.02 (2012). 
53 See FESTA, supra note 11, § 4.02. 
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originator to the mortgage-note pool.54 They thought they had accomplished this 
purpose by forming The Mortgage Electronic Recording System (MERS), which 
was up and running by the late 1990s.55 The stated purpose of MERS is to reduce 
the cost and administrative inconvenience of recording mortgage assignments.56 
Members of MERS attempt to accomplish this purpose by naming MERS as 
nominee of the originator, then trading and recording assignments internally 
without the need of recording each assignment in the local land records.57 A 
MERS mortgage contains a statement that says, in substance, that “MERS is a 
separate corporation that is acting solely as nominee for the Lender and Lender’s 
successors and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee under this Security Instrument.”58 
MERS is not named on any note endorsement. This new system was designed to 
save lenders a small but not insignificant amount of money in the form of 
recording fees every time a mortgage was transferred. Unfortunately the legal 
status of this private MERS tracking system was not clear and had not been 
ratified by Congress or state legislatures, save for a few, and the concept did not 
receive proper vetting from all affected constituents.59 Nonetheless, nearly all the 
major mortgage originators and RMBS sponsors participated in MERS, and 
MERS registered millions of mortgages within a couple of years of its inception. 
As of 2012, MERS stated that more “than 74 million mortgages have been 
recorded in the name of MERS Inc., of which 27 million are currently active.”60 
A MERS-facilitated securitization originally occurred as follows: First, a 
person would borrow from a loan originator, execute a note to the originator, and 
grant the originator a mortgage in the property securing the loan. Second, the 
originator would record the mortgage in the local recording office, naming MERS 
as nominee. Third, the originator would assign its rights in the mortgage note and 
mortgage and transfer them to an RMBS sponsor, and MERS would record the 
assignment. Fourth, the sponsor would assign the mortgage note and mortgage 
and transfer them to the RMBS trustee, and MERS would record the assignment. 
Fifth, MERS would update its database to reflect the transfer of the mortgage to 
                                                 
54 Patrick C. Sargent & Mark W. Harris, The Myths and Merits of MERS (Sept. 25, 2012), 
available at http://www.andrewskurth.com/pressroom-publications-926.html#FN1 (last visited 
August 1, 2013) (MERS-sanctioned account). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. 
58 See, e.g., Freddie Mac, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Authorized Changes for 
MERS 1 (2012), available at www.freddiemac.com/uniform/doc/unifmersauth.doc (last visited 
August 1, 2013). 
59 For example, Minnesota enacted a “MERS Statute” that allowed nominees like MERS to record 
an “assignment, satisfaction, release, or power of attorney to foreclose.” Minn. Stat. §507.413 
(2013). 
60 Sargent & Harris, supra note 54. 
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the sponsor and RMBS trustee. Figure 4 illustrates the MERS-facilitated 
securitization process as originally conceived and executed. The industry used 
this process from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s.61  
 
 
 
 During this period of time, RMBS sponsors became more sophisticated 
and the types of loans that lenders made proliferated, so RMBS sponsors 
expanded the types of RMBS that they offered. Such specialized mortgage-note 
pools included adjusted-rate-mortgage (ARM) loans with teaser rates, cash-out 
home equity loans, and various subprime products.62 One type of RMBS pool that 
emerged, and that is of particular interest here, was a second-lien RMBS. A 
second-lien RMBS trust typically held second-lien mortgage loans. In the case of 
default foreclosure, second-lien holders receive payment on their loans only after 
the first-lien is satisfied.63 These new products appeared to accelerate the demand 
for RMBS. As that demand increased in the early 2000s, loan originators and 
                                                 
61 See MERSCorp., MERS Today 2 (2012), http://www.mersinc.org/media-room/press-kit (last 
visited August 1, 2013). 
62 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 102. 
63 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, What Is a Second Mortgage Loan or Junior Lien?, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/105/what-is-a-second-mortgage-loan-or-junior-
lien.html (June 12, 2013) (last visited August 1, 2013). 
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RMBS sponsors began cutting corners at every level of the securitization process 
in order to meet investor demand. Those actions flooded RMBS trusts with 
mortgage notes that would not allow the trusts to properly account for interest 
income inflow-outflow mismatch. Therefore, this jeopardized the REMIC 
classification of an untold, but significant, percentage of all RMBS trusts. 
 Litigation decisions and documents detail the lax practices. Somewhat 
counter-intuitively, downstream litigation (litigation between borrowers and 
banks) is a primary source of information related to lax securitization practices. 
Upstream litigation (litigation between RMBS investors and banks) is a primary 
source of information relating to unsavory lending and loan-origination practices. 
The discussion of claims in this Article assumes that the plaintiffs can support 
their claims in many of the cases now being litigated. Given that these claims are 
very consistent with the findings of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the 
analysis relies on the particulars in some of the cases to paint a picture of what a 
typical REMIC might look like.64 Perhaps some RMBS trusts were not as bad as 
the Article describes, but bad actions appear to have been rampant and the portrait 
painted below very likely describes many RMBS trusts. The discussion also relies 
upon just a handful of filed complaints, but they are consistent with dozens of 
other cases.65 Other studies and reports provide a similar picture of the state of 
affairs in the RMBS and mortgage lending industry leading up to the Financial 
Crisis.66 
 
C. Deterioration of the Securitization Process (Downstream Litigation) 
 
 Corner-cutting in the lending and securitization process led to the 
Financial Crisis. In re Kemp, a frequently cited decision from the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court displays the failed securitization practices that preceded the Financial 
Crisis.67 On May 31, 2006, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (Countrywide) lent 
$167,000 to John Kemp,68 and Mr. Kemp signed a note naming Countrywide as 
                                                 
64 See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3. 
65 See, e.g., Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. UBS Americas, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 5201, at 2 n. 1 
(S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2012), available at http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/104/doc/opinion-
order-fhfa-v-ubs-americas-sdny-4-may-12.pdf (citing fifteen cases brought by the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency against numerous defendants with similar allegations); REFinblog.com 
(analyzing hundreds of downstream and upstream cases). 
66 See, e.g., John M. Griffin, and Gonzalo Maturana, Who Facilitated Misreporting in Securitized 
Loans? (Working Paper, April 30, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract+2256060 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2256060; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011). 
67 In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010). 
68 See id.at 627. 
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the lender; no endorsement by Countrywide appeared on the note.69 An unsigned 
allonge of the same date accompanied the note and directed Mr. Kemp to “Pay to 
the Order of Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., d/b/a America’s Wholesale 
Lender.”70 On the same day, Mr. Kemp signed a mortgage in the amount of 
$167,000, which listed the lender as America’s Wholesale Lender, named MERS 
as the mortgagee, and authorized it to act solely as nominee for the lender and the 
lender’s successors and assigns.71 The mortgage referenced the note Mr. Kemp 
signed and was recorded in the local county clerk’s office on July 13, 2006 (a 
month and a half after Mr. Kemp signed it).72  
 On June 28, 2006, Countrywide, as seller, entered into a PSA with 
CWABS, Inc., as depositor (i.e., sponsor); Countrywide Home Loans Servicing 
LP as master servicer; and Bank of New York (BNY) as trustee.73 The PSA 
provided that Countrywide sold, transferred, or assigned to the depositor “all the 
right, title and interest of [Countrywide] in and to the Initial Mortgage Loans, 
including all interest and principal received and receivable by [Countrywide].”74 
The PSA provided that CWABS would then transfer the Initial Mortgage Loans, 
which included Mr. Kemp’s loan, to the trustee in exchange for certificates 
referred to as Asset-backed Certificates, Series 2006-8 (the RMBS).75 
Presumably, the depositor then sold the RMBS to investors. 
 The PSA also provided that Countrywide, as depositor, would deliver “the 
original Mortgage Note, endorsed by manual or facsimile signature in blank in the 
following form: ‘Pay to the order of ________ without recourse’, with all 
intervening endorsements from the originator to the Person endorsing the 
Mortgage Note.”76 Although Mr. Kemp’s note was supposedly subject to the 
PSA, Countrywide never endorsed it in blank or delivered it to the depositor or 
trustee as required by the PSA.77 On the date of the purported transfer, no one 
recorded a transfer of the note or the mortgage with the county clerk.78 The PSA 
purported to assign Mr. Kemp’s mortgage “[t]ogether with the Bond, Note or 
other obligation described in the Mortgage, and the money due and to become due 
                                                 
69 See id. 
70 See id. An allonge is “[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for the 
purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled with indorsements.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (8th ed.2004). 
71 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627. 
72 See id. 
73 See id. Park Monaco, Inc., and Park Sienna, LLC, also entered into the PSA as sellers. See id. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. at 627–28. 
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thereon, with interest.”79 That assignment was recorded on March 24, 2008 
(almost two years after the purported assignment of the mortgage).80  
 On March 14, 2007, MERS assigned Mr. Kemp’s mortgage to BNY as 
trustee for the Certificate Holders CWABS, Inc. Asset-backed Certificates, Series 
2006-8.81 On May 9, 2008, Mr. Kemp filed voluntary bankruptcy.82 On June 11, 
2008, Countrywide, as servicer for BNY, filed a secured proof of claim noting 
Mr. Kemp’s property as collateral for the claim.83 In response, Mr. Kemp filed an 
adversary complaint on October 16, 2008, against Countrywide, seeking to 
expunge its proof of claim.84 On September 9, 2009, Countrywide claimed to 
have possession of the mortgage note.85 
 At trial in late 2009, Countrywide produced a new undated Allonge to 
Promissory Note, which directed Mr. Kemp to “Pay to the Order of Bank of New 
York, as Trustee for the Certificate-holders CWABS, Inc., Asset-backed 
Certificates, Series 6006-8.”86 A supervisor and operational team leader for the 
apparent successor entity of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (the master 
servicer in the PSA) testified that the new allonge was prepared in anticipation of 
the litigation and was signed weeks before the trial.87 That same person testified 
that Mr. Kemp’s original note never left the possession of Countrywide, but 
instead, it went to its foreclosure unit.88 She also testified that the new allonge had 
not been attached to Mr. Kemp’s note and that customarily, Countrywide 
maintained possession of the notes and related loan documents.89  
In a later submission, Countrywide represented that it had the original note 
with the new allonge attached, but it provided no additional information regarding 
the chain of title of the note.90 It also produced a Lost Note Certificate dated 
February 1, 2007, providing that Mr. Kemp’s original note had been “misplaced, 
lost or destroyed, and after a thorough and diligent search, no one has been able to 
locate the original Note.”91 The court therefore concluded that at the time of the 
                                                 
79 See id. at 627. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. at 626. 
83 See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 628. 
86 See id. The allonge misidentified the asset-backed certificates as 6006-8 instead of 2006-8. See 
id. at n.5. 
87 See id. at 628. The record leaves some doubt about whether the supervisor worked for the 
successor of Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP or Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. See id.at 
626 n.3, 628 n.6. 
88 See id. at 628. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 628–9. 
91 See id. at 628 n.7. 
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filing of the proof of claim, Mr. Kemp’s mortgage had been assigned to BNY, but 
Countrywide had not transferred possession of the associated note to BNY.92 
Figure 5 summarizes the relevant Kemp facts, illustrating the failure to timely 
transfer and record purported assignments of mortgage notes and mortgages. 
 
 
 
 The same types of problems arise in upstream litigation because the failure 
to transfer mortgage notes and mortgages to the trusts negatively affects the value 
of RMBS, violates representations in RMBS offering materials, and disregards 
provisions of PSAs.93 Studies presented in upstream litigation materials illustrate 
how rampant cases like Kemp had become. A study of almost a thousand 
mortgages that were supposed to be held by three RMBS trusts formed in 2005, 
2006, and 2007, respectively, found that none of the mortgages had been assigned 
to the trusts on the date the RMBS sponsor issued the RMBS.94 Within three 
months after the issuances of the RMBS, less than 1% of the mortgages had been 
assigned to the trusts, and more than half of the mortgages were never assigned to 
                                                 
92 See id.at 629. 
93 See, e.g., Consolidated Complaint, HSH Nordbank AG v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 
652678/2011, at 13–14, 19–20 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Apr. 2, 2012); Knights of Columbus 
Amended Complaint, supra note 45, at 11 –17. 
94 See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 15–16. 
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the trusts.95 The study also found that the parties routinely failed to transfer the 
mortgage notes to the RMBS trusts. A sample of 442 mortgage notes found that 
only 7, or 1.6% of the total notes were transferred to the trusts within three 
months after the issuance of the RMBS.96 Investigations also revealed that of the 
mortgages that the parties did eventually assign to the RMBS trusts, several were 
assigned to the wrong trust.97 Other RMBS trustees apparently disregarded and 
failed to disclose audit information that confirmed that the RMBS trust did not 
have possession of the notes.98 
Despite representations in the offering materials and provisions in the 
PSAs to the contrary, many RMBS trusts did not hold mortgage notes and 
mortgages they purported to hold on the issuance date. Even though they 
eventually acquired a small percentage of the mortgage notes and mortgages, 
those acquisitions occurred several months after the formation of the RMBS 
trusts. The RMBS sponsors were responsible to transfer the mortgage notes and 
mortgages,99 but they knew that the RMBS trusts did not have the mortgage notes 
or mortgages at the time the RMBS trust was formed. The robo-signing scandal 
that occurred in the wake of the Financial Crisis was rooted in part in an effort to 
remedy the problems that arise when notes are not properly transferred.100 This 
scandal is further evidence that the securitization process in the years preceding 
the Financial Crisis failed terribly.  Figure 6 depicts the securitization process 
described in Kemp that was prevalent in the years leading up to the Financial 
Crisis. 
 
                                                 
95 See id. at 16. 
96 See id. at 18. 
97 See id. at 17. 
98 See Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, supra note 93, at 21–22. 
99 See, e.g., Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 19. 
100 The “robo-signing scandal” refers to the widespread practice by lenders of forging signatures 
and engaging in other inappropriate behavior in foreclosure cases. Alan Zibel et al., U.S., Banks 
Near 'Robo-Signing' Settlement, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203735304577169014293051278.html. 
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The discussion below illustrates that failure of the securitization process 
jeopardizes the REMIC status of numerous RMBS trusts.101 
 
D. Deterioration of Lending Underwriting Practices (Upstream Litigation) 
 
 The discussion of the securitization process reveals that RMBS sponsors 
did not transfer mortgage notes and mortgages to the RMBS trusts. Even if they 
had transferred the mortgage notes and mortgages, the quality of the loans 
represented by the notes and mortgages was so poor, they would not satisfy 
REMIC requirements. The following discussion illustrates that RMBS sponsors 
failed to adequately perform due diligence and act on information from the due 
diligence they did perform, and lenders abandoned responsible mortgage 
underwriting practices. As a result of the failed due diligence and underwriting 
functions, loans made to unqualified borrowers for homes with undesirable 
occupancy rates entered into RMBS trusts. Poor appraisal practices also left loans 
undercollateralized. As a result of these problems, many loans were delinquent (or 
delinquency was imminent) when they entered the RMBS trusts.  
 
                                                 
101 See infra Part III. A. 
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1. Failure of Mortgage Underwriting and Due Diligence 
 
 A critical part of the RMBS securitization process is the mortgage 
underwriting function. Loan originators underwrite loans they make. 
Underwriting in this context is the process of assessing the potential risk and 
profitability of making a loan to a particular borrower.102 Traditional home 
mortgage underwriting included three elements: (1) collateral, (2) borrower 
creditworthiness (i.e., willingness to pay), and (3) the borrowers capacity to pay 
(e.g., income).103 Originators abandoned those traditional underwriting guidelines, 
and, often with the knowledge of RMBS sponsors, transferred low-quality 
mortgages notes and mortgages to RMBS trusts. Originators found that the more 
risky loan products were the most profitable, so they pressed sales agents to push 
the risky products, such as option ARM, home equity, and subprime loans, and 
they structured sales-agent compensation to encourage such efforts.104 
 As a result of the failed underwriting function, the lending practices in the 
mid-2000s became abysmal. Originators failed to verify borrowers’ employment 
or income, made loans to borrowers who they knew could not repay the loans or 
even make required payments, and reduced the time that had to pass since a 
borrower’s prior bankruptcy.105 Originators would also fake proof of loan 
applicants’ employment and rent-paying history.106 One originator developed a 
process called the High Speed Swim Lane (HSSL or Hustle) model for loan 
origination, complete with the motto, “Loans Forward, Never Backward.”107 As 
part of Hustle, the origination eliminated toll gates that slowed the originator 
process, including processes necessary for originating investment-quality loans 
                                                 
102 See WILLIAM B. BRUEGGEMAN & JEFFREY D. FISHER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENTS 213 (13th ed. 2008); DAVID C. LING & WAYNE R. ARCHER, REAL ESTATE 
PRINCIPLES: A VALUE APPROACH 304 (2d ed. 2008). 
103 See LING & ARCHER, supra note 102, at 304. 
104 See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, Subprime Mortgage Lending: A Cross-Country Blame Game, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-
subprime.4.5623442.html; Amended Complaint, Fed. Housing Fin. Agency v. JPMorgan Chase & 
Co., No. 11 Civ. 6188, at 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2012) (on file with authors). 
105 See Bajaj, supra note 104; JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 104, at 93, 172–187. 
106 See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Examples of Mortgage and Real Estate Fraud 
Investigations - Fiscal Year 2013, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Examples-of-Mortgage-and-Real-Estate-
Fraud-Investigations-Fiscal-Year-2013 (listing successful prosecutions involving 
misrepresentations in loan applications of employment, rent payment and other material terms); 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 12 (noting that Minnesota Attorney 
General’s office found “file after file where the [Ameriquest] borrowers were described as 
‘antiques dealers’”). 
107 See Complaint-in-Intervention, United States v. Bank of America Corporation, No. 12 Civ. 
1422, at 16 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/October12/BankofAmericanSuit/BofA%20Complai
nt.pdf. 
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and for preventing fraud.108 Hustle even eliminated the underwriting function 
from all but the riskiest loans.109 Originators also steered borrowers to high risk 
products and granted loans without establishing credit scores.110 With this 
process, they would make loans to just about anybody who applied for one, even 
though the borrowers clearly did not qualify.111 RMBS sponsors were aware that 
originators had abandoned their underwriting guidelines.112 
 RMBS sponsors also relaxed their due diligence practices well below the 
standards they represented in offering materials. For example, sponsors instructed 
due diligence vendors not to verify occupancy status or credit scores.113 Sponsors 
knew that they had to accept bad loans to preserve business relationships with 
loan originators, so they disregarded due diligence standards and accepted poor-
quality loans.114 They also abandoned basic due diligence tasks, such as 
determining the reasonableness of income in a stated-income loan.115 Sponsors 
would uncover problematic loans, but they would still accept them into RMBS 
trusts. One study shows that up to 65% of the loans accepted into securitizations 
violated underwriting guidelines, but RMBS sponsors knowingly included 
them.116 The poor quality of loans does not satisfy REMIC requirements.117 
 
2. Failed Appraisal Function 
 
 Pressure to produce loans also caused the appraisal function to fail. The 
failure of the appraisal function resulted in misstated loan-to-value (LTV) ratios 
of securitized loans. The LTV ratio is one of the most important measures of the 
riskiness of a loan. Loans with high LTV ratios are more likely to default because 
                                                 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
110 See, e.g., Press Release, Justice Department Reaches $335 Million Settlement to Resolve 
Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Dec. 21, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-ag-1694.html; Dexia v. Bear, 
Stearns & Co., Inc., 12 Civ. 4761, 25–31 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2013) (on file with authors) 
(describing several loans that an originator issued despite obvious problems with the borrowers’ 
qualifications) . 
111 See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at xxii; BoA Complaint-in-
Intervention, supra note 107, at 16. 
112 See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at xxii; JPMorgan Amended 
Complaint, supra note 104, at 197–232. 
113 See Dexia 12 Civ. 4761, at 12. 
114 See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 109-11; J. P. Morgan 
Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 18; Complaint at 35–47, Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. 
Credit Suisse Group AG, No. 653665/2011, at 35–47 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County Dec. 29, 2011). 
115 See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 109-11; J. P. Morgan 
Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 19. 
116 J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 19. 
117 See infra part III. B. 
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the owners have less interest in a property with a high LTV ratio.118 For example, 
if the loan is 90% of a $150,000 property, the owner’s interest in the property is 
only $15,000 ($150,000 x 10%), giving the owner ten percent equity. On the other 
hand, if the LTV ratio is 60%, the owner’s interest is $60,000 ($150,000 x 40%). 
Thus, the owner with an LTV ratio of 60% would lose more than an owner with 
an LTV ratio of 90%, if the owner of the mortgage foreclosed. An RMBS trust is 
also much less likely to recover the amount of a loan in a foreclosure sale if a 
borrower with a high LTV ratio defaults on a loan.119  
An important aspect of the LTV ratio is the appraised value of the 
property securing the loan. To help ensure that the appraised value was high 
enough to meet the representations in the RMBS offering materials, sponsors 
pressured originators and originators pressured appraisers to help ensure that the 
appraised values met the sponsors’ requirements.120 In fact, a 2007 study reported 
that 90% of appraisers had been pressured to raise property valuations.121 
Originators blacklisted appraisers who refused to inflate collateral values, and 
sponsors instructed due diligence vendors not to review appraisals.122 As a result 
of these measures, appraisers increased the stated appraisal value of collateral 
80% of the time that originators requested reconsideration.123 
 The failed appraisal function caused the LTV ratio of numerous loans to 
be much higher than sponsors represented. Widespread and systematic 
overvaluations by mortgage originators created a snowball effect that inflated 
appraised housing prices across the country.124 To illustrate, an appraiser might 
overvalue a home by 10% based upon comparable sales and a few months later 
                                                 
118 See generally Min Qi & Xiaolong Yang, Loss Given Default of High Loan-to-Value Residential 
Mortgages, 33 J. BANKING & FIN.788 ( 2009). 
119 See id. 
120 See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 77. See also Peter S. Goodman & Gretchen 
Morgenson, Saying Yes, WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at A1 
(describing the practice of originators and appraisers in the early 2000s); Michael Moss & 
Geraldine Fabrikant, Once Trusted Mortgage Pioneers, Now Scrutinized, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 
2008, at A1. 
121 See Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 77–78; see also Press Release, A.G. Schneiderman 
Secures $7.8 Million Settlement With First American Corporation And Eappraiseit For Role In 
Housing Market Meltdown (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-
schneiderman-secures-78-million-settlement-first-american-corporation-and. 
122 See, e.g., Dexia, 12 Civ. 4761; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 18, 
91-92; Vikas Bajaj, In Deal with Cuomo, Mortgage Giants Accept Appraisal Standards, N. Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/business/04loans.html.  
123 See id. 
124 See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 78 (citing the testimony of Richard Bitner, a 
former executive of a subprime mortgage originator); FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, 
supra note 3, at 18, 91-92. 
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overvalue a similar home by an additional 10% based on the recent appraisal.125 
Through this cumulative process, appraisals significantly contributed to a run-up 
in property values.126 For example, the LTV ratio of a $100,000 loan would be 
about 90% of the property’s value, were the value $111,000. If the appraiser 
overstated the value by 10%, so the property’s value appeared to be $122,000, the 
LTV ratio for the $100,000 loan would appear to be about 82%, instead of 90%. 
An additional 10% overstatement on a similar home would give it an appraised 
value of $134,000. A $100,000 loan on such property would have a 75% LTV 
ratio. The cumulative process of poor appraisal practices thus had a significant 
effect on LTV ratios. 
 Other practices, such as the use of piggy-back loans (i.e., second or third 
loans issued on the acquisition of a property to help ensure that the LTV ratio of 
the first mortgage does not exceed 80% of the value of the collateral) also affected 
the LTV ratios. A loan with an LTV ratio of less than 80% has a low LTV ratio 
and is a desirable loan, but a loan is underwater if it has an LTV ratio greater than 
100% (i.e., the loan exceeds the value of the property).127 RMBS sponsors 
routinely overstated the percentage of loans that they securitized with low LTV 
ratios and understated the percentage of loans that were underwater.128 In fact 
studies of loans in numerous RMBS trusts found that the RMBS sponsors 
routinely represented that the pools had no underwater loans.129 Samples of the 
loans in those pools showed, however, that a material portion of loans from the 
studied pool was underwater, with percentages of underwater loans in several 
pools exceeding 10% and some exceeding 30%.130 Not surprisingly, RMBS 
sponsors, who made it their business to know this industry, appeared to be aware 
of the inflated appraisals and the effect they had on LTV ratios.131 Nonetheless, 
                                                 
125 See Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 78 (citing the testimony of Richard Bitner, a 
former executive of a subprime mortgage originator). 
126 See, e.g., id.; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 3, at 18, 91-92.  
127 See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 81; FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, 
supra note 3, at 404. 
128 See Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 81–82 (presenting data that shows one RMBS 
promoter overstated the percentage of loans with low LTV ratios by as much as 42%, and 
understated loans that were underwater by as much as 40%); JPMorgan Amended Complaint, 
supra note 104, at 138–142 (presenting data that shows RMBS promoters routinely overstated the 
loans with low LTV ratios and understated the percentage of underwater loans). 
129 See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 104, at 138–142; Stichting Complaint, supra 
note 114, at 28-29. 
130 See JPMorgan Amended Complaint, supra note 104, at 138–142; Nordbank Consolidated 
Complaint, supra note 93, at 28-29. 
131 See, e.g., Stichting Complaint, supra note 114, at 79–82. 
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they populated RMBS trusts with undersecured loans.132 Those actions undermine 
REMIC classification.133 
 
3. Failure to Screen and Cure Delinquent Loans 
 
 In addition to the other defects described above, RMBS sponsors knew 
that the delinquency and default rates of securitized loans were much higher than 
they represented or that the loans would become delinquent shortly after 
securitization.134 For example, RMBS sponsors would transfer loans to trusts prior 
to the expiration of the early payment-default period (the 30- to 90-day period 
following the purchase of a loan during which the sponsor could force the 
originator to repurchase a delinquent or default loan).135 Transferring loans to 
trusts before the expiration of the early payment-default period greatly increases 
the likelihood that the loans will go into default while in the RMBS trust.136 
Sponsors also knew that loans from certain originators had high delinquency 
rates, but they continued to purchase loans from those originators and securitize 
them.137 In fact, sponsors recognized that a significant portion of the loans that 
they were securitizing were 30 or more days delinquent, but they continued to 
transfer them to trusts and sell securities in the trusts.138 
 Despite high delinquency rates,139 RMBS sponsors did not enforce 
repurchase provisions of the PSAs.140 Instead, sponsors and originators would 
collude to skirt repurchase provisions of the PSA for their own gain at the expense 
of the RMBS investors. RMBS sponsors supposedly adopted quality control 
measures to determine whether the loans maintained their quality after being 
transferred to the trust.141 If a loan was in default prior to the end of the early 
payment-default period, it would be defective and covered by the PSA’s 
repurchase provision.142 Instead of enforcing the repurchase provision and 
                                                 
132 Dexia, 12 Civ. 4761, at 15. 
133 See infra Part III. B. 
134 See, e.g., Dexia, 12 Civ. 4761, at 13–14; J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 
25–26. 
135 See Amended Complaint, Dexia SA/NV v. Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc, No. 650180/2012, at 23 
(May 18, 2012). 
136 See id. at 23–24. 
137 See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 11 (claiming that the sponsor knew that 
the almost 60% of an originator’s loans were 30 or more days delinquent, but they continued to 
purchase loans from that originator). 
138 See id. (referring to securitization as a “SACK OF SHIT” and “shit breather” because the loans 
the sponsor was securitizing were so terrible). 
139 See, e.g., Dexia, supra note 110, at 7. 
140 See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28. 
141 See KRAVITT, supra note 52, § 16.04. 
142 See id. 
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removing defective loans from the RMBS trust, however, a sponsor would enter 
into confidential settlements with originators at a fraction of the loan’s original 
price.143 The sponsor could then pocket the settlement payment and leave the 
defective loan in the RMBS trust.144 Not only did such behavior deprive RMBS 
investors of assets that were rightfully theirs, the behavior also demonstrates that 
RMBS sponsors were well aware that the loans they were securitizing were well 
below the quality they represented in the offering materials. These practices could 
deny RMBS trusts REMIC classification.145 
 
E. Realistic Hypothetical RMBS Trust 
 
 The information from numerous sources paints a bleak picture of the state 
of the RMBS industry and reveals that a significant percentage of the products 
that RMBS sponsors sold during the years leading up to the Financial Crisis were 
rubbish. Until plaintiffs exhaust their investigations through discovery, try cases 
with respect to specific RMBS trusts, and courts decide such cases and publish the 
facts, the general public cannot know with specificity all of the bad acts that 
RMBS organizers engaged in with respect to any single RMBS trust. Nonetheless, 
information in the news media, academic studies, court filings, and government 
reports provide the basis for constructing a realistic hypothetical RMBS trust. 
Many, perhaps the vast majority of, RMBS trusts created in the years leading up 
to the Financial Crisis appear to have had significant defects. This information 
provides the opportunity to create a realistic hypothetical. Undoubtedly, some 
trusts would not suffer from all of the ills that afflict the hypothetical trust. 
Nonetheless, no serious observer would dispute the almost certain possibility that 
trusts like the realistic hypothetical trust were formed and continue to exist. The 
following realistic hypothetical trust provides the opportunity to apply the REMIC 
requirements to an RMBS trust created prior to the Financial Crisis. The analysis 
reveals the almost certain impossibility that such a trust could be a REMIC. It also 
provides a blueprint that the IRS (or private parties in qui tam or whistleblower 
cases) can follow to challenge REMIC classification. A similar analysis would 
apply to other RMBS trusts that may not be as defective as this hypothetical 
RMBS trust. 
 
Characteristics of Realistic Hypothetical Second-Lien RMBS Trust 
 The sponsor issued RMBS in the hypothetical trust in early 2007.  
                                                 
143 See, e.g., J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28. 
144 See id. 
145 See infra Part III. B. 
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 The sponsor did not transfer any of the mortgage notes or assign any of the 
mortgages to the RMBS trust within three months after the date it issued 
the RMBS securities to investors.  
 The mortgages in the RMBS were recorded in MERS’s name as nominee 
for the originators, but there is no public record of the assignment of the 
mortgages to the RMBS trust. 
 An affiliate of the originator serviced the mortgage notes. 
 The RMBS trust consists only of second-lien loans.  
 The loans that the RMBS trust purportedly owns have the following 
composition: 
o The originator did not obtain verification of the borrowers 
employment for 75% of the loans; 
o The LTV ratio for of 75% of the loans exceeded 100% on the date 
of formation; 
o Within the early payment-default period, 66% of the loans were in 
default, but the sponsor made no effort to remove the loans from 
the RMBS trust. 
o The occupancy rate of the collateral was significantly lower than 
the occupancy rate represented in the offering materials. 
 The loans that the RMBS trust purportedly owns were geographically 
diverse, with loans from all or many of the fifty states. 
 The RMBS sponsor would not require the originator to repurchase 
defective loans and would retain settlement proceeds received from the 
originator from defective loans. 
  
III. REMIC QUALIFICATION 
  
With a somewhat clear picture of the RMBS industry in the years leading 
up to the Financial Crisis, and with a realistic hypothetical trust to examine 
closely, the analysis turns to the tax aspects of REMICs. Federal tax treatment of 
REMICs is important in two respects. First, it specially classifies REMICs as 
something other than tax corporations, tax partnerships, or trusts and generally 
exempts REMICs from federal income taxation.146 Second, it treats regular 
interests in REMICs as debt instruments.147 These two characteristics provide 
REMICs and their investors favorable tax treatment. REMICs must compute 
taxable income, but because the regular interests are treated as debt instruments, 
REMICs deduct from their gross income amounts that constitute interest 
                                                 
146 See I.R.C. § 860A(a). 
147 See I.R.C. §§ 860B(a), 860C(b)(1)(A). 
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payments to the holders of regular interests.148 Without these rules, a REMIC 
would most likely be a tax corporation and the regular interests could be equity 
interests.149 If that were the case, the REMIC would not be able to deduct 
payments made to the regular interest holders and, as a taxable C corporation,  
would owe federal income tax on a very significant amount of taxable income.150 
Thus, REMIC classification provides significant tax benefits. 
 To obtain REMIC classification, an RMBS trust must satisfy several 
requirements.151 Of particular interest in this context is the requirement that within 
three months after the trust’s startup date substantially all of the RMBS trust 
assets must be qualified mortgages or permitted investments (the substantially-all 
test).152 Mortgage notes would not come with the definition of permitted 
investment, so this Article focuses on whether an RMBS trust’s assets would be 
qualified mortgages.153 REMIC classification thus has four requirements: (1) the 
ownership requirement (the RMBS trust must be the tax owner of qualified 
mortgages), (2) the qualified-mortgage requirement (the assets of the RMBS trust 
must be qualified mortgages), (3) a timing requirement (the RMBS trust must 
own a static pool of qualified mortgages within three months after the RMBS 
startup date), and (4) the substantially-all requirement (the RMBS trust’s assets 
must be almost exclusively qualified mortgages).  
 Congress and Treasury designed the REMIC classification rules for 
arrangements that existed in 1986 when Congress created REMICs.154 The rules 
do not address the wide scale problems of the Financial Crisis, so many of the 
issues discussed in the following analysis will be issues of first impression when a 
                                                 
148 See I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 860C(b)(1)(A); Van Brunt, supra note 31, at 168 (“[R]egular interests in 
the REMIC shall be treated as indebtedness of the REMIC. This is one of the important advances 
made by the REMIC legislation—to remove the vexing debt vs. equity issue. In this context, the 
principal effect of this statutory pronouncement is to ensure that relevant payments to regular 
interest holders constitute interest and thus are deductible in computing REMIC taxable income or 
net loss.”). 
149 If an arrangement loses REMIC status, it will likely be classified as a taxable mortgage pool or 
a publicly-traded partnership (assuming its interests are publicly traded). See KRAVITT, supra note 
52, § 16.04.  
150 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
151 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 860D(a) (defining REMIC); 860D(b) (requiring the RMBS trust to make an 
election). 
152 See I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4).  
153 The principal assets of a mortgage-backed security are mortgages, not the type of asset that 
comes within the definition of permitted investment. Thus, the test is whether the assets are 
qualified mortgages. If mortgage notes fail to come within the definition of qualified mortgages, 
they will most likely not come within the definition of permitted investment. 
154 See supra text accompanying notes 40-44. 
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court considers them.155 A large body of law considers the question of tax 
ownership in various contexts, including the ownership of obligations,156 but none 
of that law considers whether a purported REMIC is the tax owner of mortgage 
notes. Beyond the guidance in the regulations, no authority appears to address the 
qualified-mortgage requirement, the timing requirement, or the substantially-all 
requirement. Thus, existing law provides a framework for part of the analysis, but 
much of the analysis is original. The extensive body of law governing tax 
ownership makes the analysis of the ownership requirement larger (but no more 
important) than the analysis of the other requirements. 
 
A. Ownership Requirement 
 
 An arrangement comes within the definition of REMIC only if it owns 
qualified mortgages within the required time period (assuming none of its assets 
are permitted investments).157 The federal tax definition of ownership governs 
whether a purported REMIC owns qualified mortgages.158 Federal tax law does 
not defer to the state-law definition of ownership, but it looks to state law to 
determine parties’ rights, obligations, and interests in property.159 Tax law can 
also disregard the transfer (or lack of transfer) of formal title where the transferor 
retains many of the benefits and burdens of ownership.160 Courts focus on 
whether the benefits and burdens of ownership pass from one party to another 
when considering who is the tax owner of property.161 “To properly discern the 
                                                 
155 Courts are just beginning to identify the interplay between the REMIC rules, foreclosure 
statutes and the laws governing the transfer of notes. See, e.g., Glaski v. Bank of America, No. 
F064556 (July 31, 2013 Cal. 5th App. Dist.). 
156 See infra Part III. A. 
157 See I.R.C. § 860 D(a)(4) (requiring substantially all of a purported REMIC’s assets to be 
qualified mortgages or permitted investments within three months after the startup date). 
158 See Bradley T. Borden & David J. Reiss, Beneficial Ownership and the REMIC Classification 
Rules, 28 TAX MGMT. REAL EST. J. 274 (Nov. 7, 2012). 
159 See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 110 (1932) (“The state law creates legal interests, 
but the federal statute determines when and how they shall be taxed. We examine [state] law only 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether the leases conform to the standard with the taxing statute 
prescribes for giving the favored treatment to capital gains.”); United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 
190, 197 (1971). 
160 See Bailey v. Comm’r, 912 F2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1990). 
161 A frequently cited case for this principle is Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 
1221, 1237 (1981). Other authorities include Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315, 1327 (11th Cir. 2012); Kinsey v. Comm’r, T.C. 
Memo 2011-257. See also I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); Tech. Adv 
Memo. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998). In Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc., the Tax Court listed eight 
factors that it considered relevant in determining whether a sale occurs for tax purposes: “(1) 
Whether legal title passes; (2) how the parties treat the transaction; (3) whether an equity was 
acquired in the property; (4) whether the contract creates a present obligation on the seller to 
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true character of [a transaction], it is necessary to ascertain the intention of the 
parties as evidenced by the written agreements, read in light of the attending facts 
and circumstances.”162 If, however, the transaction does not coincide with the 
parties’ bona fide intentions, courts will ignore the stated intentions.163 Thus, the 
analysis of ownership cannot merely look to the agreements the parties entered 
into because the label parties give to a transaction does not determine its status.164 
Instead, the analysis must examine the underlying economics and the attending 
facts and circumstances to determine who owns the mortgage notes for tax 
purposes.165 
 The analysis of mortgage-note ownership begins with an examination of a 
fundamental indicium of owning an obligation—the right to enforce the 
obligation.166 In re Kemp addressed the issue of enforceability of a mortgage note 
under the uniform commercial code (U.C.C.) in the bankruptcy context.167 The 
                                                                                                                                     
execute and deliver a deed and a present obligation on the purchaser to make payments; (5) 
whether the right of possession is vested in the purchaser; (6) which party pays the property taxes; 
(7) which party bears the risk of loss or damage to the property; and (8) which party receives the 
profits from the operation and sale of the property.” Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Comm’r, 77 
T.C. 1221, 1237–38 (1981) (internal citations omitted). 
162 See Haggard v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 1124, 1129 (1955), aff’d 241 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1956). 
163 See Union Planters National Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir. 
1970) (“We do not agree that subjective intent is decisive here.”); Fairly Realty Co. v. Comm’r, 
279 F.2d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 1960).  
164 See Helvering v. Lazarus & Co. 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939); Mapco Inc. v. United States, 556 
F.2d 1107, 1110 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-191-20 (Dec. 20, 1979) (disregarding a lease 
agreement to rule privately that an arrangement was a sale). 
165 See Helvering v. F.&R. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939) (“In the field of taxation, 
administrators of the laws, and the courts, are concerned with substance and realities, and formal 
written documents are not rigidly binding.”); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935); 
Wash. Mut. Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2011) (“As an overarching 
principle, absent specific provision, the tax consequences of any particular transaction must reflect 
the economic reality.”); Lazarus v. Comm’r, 513 F.2d 824, 829 n. 9 (9th Cir. 1975) (“‘Technical 
considerations, niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia which 
inventive genius may construct’ must not frustrate an examination of the facts in the light of 
economic realities.” (citing Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334 (1940)); Union Planters, 426 
F.2d at 118 (“In cases where the legal characterization of economic facts is decisive, the principle 
is well established that the tax consequences should be determined by the economic substance of 
the transaction, not the labels put on it for property law (or tax avoidance) purposes.” (citing 
Comm’r v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1958), Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 
(1935)). 
166 See JAMES M. PEASLEE & DAVID Z. NIRENBERG, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
SECURITIZATION TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED TOPICS 80 (4th ed. 2011) (“The power to control 
encompasses the right to take any of the actions relating to a debt instrument that may be taken by 
its owner, including enforcing or modifying its terms or disposing of the asset.”).  
167 See In re Kemp, 440 B.R. 624 (Bkrtcy.D.N.J. 2010). A claim in bankruptcy is disallowed after 
an objection “to the extent that . . . such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of 
the debtor, under any agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is 
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court held that a note was unenforceable against the maker of the note and the 
maker’s property under the U.C.C. on two grounds.168 The court held that the 
alleged owner of the note, BNY, could not enforce the note because it did not 
have possession and because the note lacked proper indorsement.169 Recognizing 
that the mortgage note came within the U.C.C. definition of negotiable 
instrument,170 the court considered who is entitled to enforce a negotiable 
instrument under the U.C.C.171 The three types of persons entitled to enforce a 
negotiable instrument are: (1) “the holder of the instrument, [2] a nonholder in 
possession of the instrument who has the right of a holder, or [3] a person not in 
possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the instrument pursuant to 
[U.C.C. § 3-309 or 3-301(d)].”172 The court then explained why BNY was not a 
person entitled to enforce the mortgage note. 
 First, the court described why BNY was not the holder of Mr. Kemp’s 
note. A holder is “the person in possession if the instrument is payable to bearer 
or, in the case of an instrument payable to an identified person, if the identified 
person is in possession.”173 A person does not qualify as a holder by merely 
possessing or owning a note.174 Instead, a person becomes a holder through 
“negotiation.”175 The two elements of negotiation are (1) transfer of possession to 
the transferee and (2) indorsement by the holder.176 The court recognized that 
because BNY never came into physical possession of the note, it was not the 
holder.177 It also recognized that the indorsed allonge was not affixed to the 
                                                                                                                                     
contingent or unmatured.” See id. at 629 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). New Jersey adopted the 
U.C.C. in 1962. CLARK E. ALPERT ET AL., GUIDE TO NEW JERSEY CONTRACT LAW § 1.3.2 (2011). 
This article cites to the U.C.C. generally instead of specifically to the New Jersey U.C.C. to 
illustrate the general applicability of the holding. Other courts have reached conclusions similar to 
the Bankruptcy Court’s opinion. See, e.g., Cutler v. U.S. Bank National Association 109 So. 3d 
224 (Fla. App. 2d Dist. 2012) (holding that if a bank could not establish that it was the holder of 
the mortgage note or allonge that took effect prior to the date of the complaint, it did not have 
standing to bring a foreclosure claim). 
168 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 629–30. 
169 See id. at 629–30. 
170 See id. at 630 (citing the definition of “negotiable instrument” in [U.C.C. § 3-104]: “an 
unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other 
charges described in the promise or order, if it: (1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is 
issued or first comes into possession of a holder; (2) is payable on demand or at a definite time.”). 
171 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 630.  
172 See U.C.C. § 3-301. 
173 See U.C.C. § 1-201(20). 
174 See Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev. Inc., 852 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1988). 
175 See U.C.C. § 3-201(a). 
176 See U.C.C. § 3-201(b). 
177 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 630 (citing Dolin v. Darnall, 115 N.J.L. 508, 181 A. 201 (E&A 1935) 
(“Since the plaintiff was not ‘in possession of’ the notes in question, he was neither the ‘holder’ 
nor the ‘bearer’ thereof.”). The court also rejected the claim that the Bank of New York was in 
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original note until the second trial date (the first trial date is relevant for 
determining rights), so BNY also failed to satisfy the second element.178 Thus, to 
have the rights of enforcement as holder, a person must be in possession of an 
indorsed note at the time when holder status is important. Based on the 
information presented above, many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical 
second-lien RMBS trust, would not be holders of many of the mortgage notes 
they claim to own. 
 Second, the court described why BNY was not a non-holder in 
possession.179 The U.C.C. provides that “[a] person may be a person entitled to 
enforce the instrument even though the person is not the owner of the instrument 
or is in wrongful possession of the instrument,”180 which would include a person 
in possession who is not a holder.181 Therefore, a person can be a nonholder in 
possession if the person acquires an unendorsed note as a successor to a holder of 
the note.182 The court recognized that BNY was a successor to a holder and would 
qualify as a non-holder in possession, if it had possession of the note.183 Because 
BNY lacked possession, however, it was not a non-holder in possession.184 Many 
RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, would similarly 
fail to be non-holders in possession of many of the mortgage notes they claim to 
own. 
 Finally, the court concluded that BNY was not a non-holder not in 
possession that could enforce the note.185 A non-holder not in possession of a note 
can enforce a note that is lost, destroyed, or stolen.186 To enforce the note under 
these rules, however, the person must satisfy three requirements.187 First, prior to 
the loss, the person must have been in possession of the note and have been 
entitled to enforce it when the loss of possession occurred.188 Second, the loss of 
possession cannot have been the result of transfer by the person or a lawful 
seizure.189 Third, the person must be unable to reasonably obtain possession 
because the instrument was destroyed, the person cannot determine its 
whereabouts, or it is in the wrongful possession of an unknown person or a person 
                                                                                                                                     
constructive possession of the note because the U.C.C. requires actual possession. See Kemp, 440 
B.R. at 631 n.13 (citing N.J.S.A. § 12A:1-201(20)).  
178 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 631.  
179 See id. at 632. 
180 See U.C.C. § 3-301. 
181 See U.C.C. § 3-301 Comment. 
182 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632; U.C.C. § 3-301 Comment. 
183 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632. 
184 See id. at 632. 
185 See id. at 633. 
186 See U.C.C. § 3-309 . 
187 See U.C.C. § 3-309(a). 
188 See id. 
189 See id. 
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that cannot be found or is not amenable to service of process.190 Finding that BNY 
was never in possession of the note, the court held that it was not a non-holder not 
in possession. Considering common practices of the times, many RMBS trusts, 
including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, will also fail to be non-
holders not in possession.191 
 Another important aspect of the court’s decision in In re Kemp is the 
discussion regarding the difference between ownership of a note and the right to 
enforce the note. The court recognized that the recorded assignment of the 
mortgage evidenced an attempt to assign the note, and the PSA provided for an 
assignment of the note.192 The court acknowledged that those documents “created 
an ownership issue, but did not transfer the right to enforce the note.”193 “The 
right to enforce an instrument and ownership of the instrument are two different 
concepts.”194 The U.C.C. acknowledges that a person may transfer all right, title, 
and interest in a note to a transferee, which gives the transferee a claim to 
ownership of the note.195 The transferee is not, however, entitled to enforce the 
note until the transferee obtains possession of it, so transfer of the instrument 
occurs only when the transferor delivers it to the transferee.196 Thus, the court 
concluded that BNY had a valid claim to ownership, but did not have the right to 
enforce the note.197 Based upon sworn testimony, originators retained possession 
of mortgage notes as a matter of course.198 Because many RMBS trusts, including 
the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, did not have possession of the mortgage 
notes on the startup date, or three months thereafter, they could not enforce the 
                                                 
190 See id.  
191 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 632–33. Kemp cites Marks v. Braunstein, 439 B.R. 248 (D.Mass. 2010), 
which held that a person who was never in possession of the note could not enforce it). The 
purpose of requiring prior possession in a lost-note claim is to protector a borrower from multiple 
claims, but the Marks court followed a strict interpretation of the statute and disallowed the claim 
of the person who was never in possession of the note, even though conflicting enforcement 
claims were not a concern in the case. See 439 B.R. at 251 (citing Premier Capital, LLC v. Gavin, 
319 B.R. 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2004)).  
192 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 624. 
193 See id. 
194 See U.C.C. § 3-203 Comment 1. 
195 See id. 
196 See id. 
197 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 633–34. The court also found that even if Countrywide Home Loans, 
Inc., as servicer for the Bank of New York and holder of the note, was the agent of the Bank of 
New York, it would have no greater right than the Bank of New York had. Because the Bank of 
New York had no right to enforce the note, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., would have no right 
to enforce the note. See In re Kemp at 634. This ruling refutes the position that even though the 
REMIC trust does not have possession of a note, it can enforce it through the PSA using the 
servicer as an agent.  
198 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 628. 
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notes during that relevant time period. Thus, they lacked an important indicium of 
ownership at the relevant time. 
 Courts and the IRS have considered note ownership for tax purposes in 
other contexts and a number of cases and rulings provide additional guidance for 
considering who owns the notes and mortgages. The IRS derived eight factors 
from the cases that courts consider to determine whether the benefits and burdens 
of an obligation pass from one party to another.199 The respective factors do not 
have any particular weight, and the circumstances will determine which factors 
are the most important.200 In fact, “an exclusive list of factors risks over-
formalizing the concept of ‘sale,’ hamstrings a court’s effort to discern a 
transaction’s substance and realities in evaluating tax consequences.”201 Thus, 
courts may apply a flexible, case-by-case analysis to determine whether benefits 
and burdens have transferred.202 The economics of a transaction may, however, 
dictate that only the risk of loss and potential for gain have real significance, and 
then only to the extent that they are economically realistic.203 Thus, the factors aid 
with the analysis, but they are not definitive. The following analysis illustrates, 
however, that many of the benefits and burdens of owning mortgage notes did not 
transfer to many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS 
trust. 
 
(1)  Did parties treat the transaction as a sale? 
  
 The first factor is whether the parties treat the transactions as a sale.204 
Courts and the IRS consider many different variables when deciding whether 
parties treat a transaction as a sale. For example, they look at the agreement 
between the parties to help determine whether the parties treat the transaction as a 
sale.205 In the case of purported REMICs that were part of MERS-facilitated 
securitizations, the PSA provided that the originator would transfer the mortgage 
notes and the purported REMIC trust would acquire them.206 PSAs also provide 
                                                 
199 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); Tech. Adv Memo. 98-39-001 
(May 29, 1998).  
200 See Calloway 691 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2012): Sollberger v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1119, 1124–25 
(9th Cir. 2012); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
201 See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1124 (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 
(1978) and Lazarus v. Comm’r, 513 F.2d 824, 829 n.9 (9th Cir. 1975)). 
202 See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1124 (citing Gray v. Comm’r, 561 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1977)). 
203 See Tech. Adv Memo. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (focusing on risk of loss in a typical high 
quality auto loan securitization). 
204 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
205 See United Surgical Steel Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1215, 1220–22, 30 (1970). 
206 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627; Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, supra note 45, at 11–
17. 
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that mortgage servicers and REMIC trustees will verify the transfer of the 
mortgage notes and grant the REMICs legal recourse to obtain untransferred 
notes.207 The agreements may, however, be inconclusive because they may have 
conflicting positions.208 Courts and the IRS will also ignore the agreement if other 
actions by the parties and the economics of the arrangement belie the nominal 
description in the documents.209 Instead, they consider whether the purported 
transferee parted “with any substantial incident of ownership . . . of the 
obligation,” 210 and they will consider whether the purported transferee “retained 
title to, and possession of, the . . . obligations.”211 
Originators commonly retained possession of the mortgage notes, so in 
that respect, the parties did not treat the transaction as a transfer.212 Sponsors also 
disregarded the repurchase provisions of the PSAs and instead of purging RMBS 
trusts of defective loans, they agreed to receive settlement proceeds from the 
originators.213 Thus, the PSAs provide for the transfer of possession of the 
mortgage notes but the parties routinely disregarded the provisions of the PSA, 
and uniformly did in the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust. The actions of the 
parties therefore conflict with the agreement, and actions should trump the 
agreement. 
Courts and the IRS will also look at how the parties treat the transaction 
for tax and accounting purposes to determine tax ownership.214 For federal 
income tax and accounting purposes, the parties appear to have treated the RMBS 
trust as both owner and non-owner. With no information to the contrary, this 
analysis assumes that the parties allocated the cash flows from borrowers to the 
trusts, and the trusts paid those amounts to the RMBS investors. The RMBS trusts 
also presumably recognized interest income from the loans and deducted interest 
paid to the RMBS investors. Presumably, they also allocated phantom income to 
                                                 
207 See Knights of Columbus Amended Complaint, supra note 45, at 21–22. 
208 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (finding language in a servicing 
agreement that treated the transaction as a sale and language in the private placement 
memorandum that treated the transaction as a financing arrangement). 
209 See Haggard v. Comm’r, 241 F.2d 288, 289 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The intent of the parties was 
perfectly plain. The bare fact that one of the joined documents was drawn in lease form and 
terminology by the parties is of no consequence.”). 
210 See Town & Country Food Co. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 1049, 1057 (1969). 
211 See id. 
212 See supra text accompanying note 198. 
213 See supra text accompanying notes 140-144. 
214 See Sollberger, 691 F.3d at 1122, 1125 (recognizing that the parties stopped reporting interest 
earned on the purported collateral and the purported borrower stopped making interest payments); 
United Surgical Steel Co., 54 T.C. at 1221–22; Yancey Bros. Co. v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 
441, 446 (N.D. GA 1970) (recognizing that the taxpayer continued to pay intangibles tax due from 
the owner of a note held that no transfer occurred); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 
(Apr. 20, 2001). 
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the holders of the residual interests. In those ways, the parties treated the RMBS 
trusts as tax owners of the mortgage notes. 
Nonetheless, the originators and sponsors knew that a significant 
percentage of the loans were defective, but they did not replace them.215 Instead, 
they agreed between themselves to settle the originator’s repurchase price and 
deprive the RMBS investors of their right to the funds.216 Thus, they knew that the 
loans were worth less than the amount accounted for, but they did not adjust their 
tax accounting accordingly. In this respect, the parties treated someone other than 
the RMBS trust as tax owner of the mortgage notes. 
Taxes also include recording fees that parties must pay to record the 
transfer of a mortgage note or mortgage. The parties treated the transaction as 
something other than a sale for state fee recording purposes. Many mortgages 
recorded by MERS provide that MERS is nominee or agent of the mortgagee’s 
successors or assigns, but the parties often would not record the assignment of the 
mortgage note to the RMBS trust.217 Apparently the parties generally would not 
record mortgage assignments to avoid paying recording fees and taxes at the time 
of the purported transfers from the originator to the trust.218 Consequently, for 
state recording fee purposes, the parties treated the originator or MERS as the 
owner of the mortgage note, but not the trust. Local jurisdictions now seek 
recording fees for unrecorded assignments of mortgage notes.219 Failure to record 
the transfer of a mortgage note to RMBS trusts is another way in which the parties 
treated someone other than the RMBS trusts as tax owner. 
  
(2)  Were obligors notified of transfer of obligations? 
 
 The second factor is whether the parties notify the obligor of the transfer 
of obligations.220 Failure to notify the obligor of a transfer of an obligation 
                                                 
215 See supra text accompanying notes 140-144. 
216 See id. 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 54-57. 
218 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 628 (recording assignment of mortgage twenty-one months after the 
parties executed the PSA and the originator purportedly transferred the note and the trust acquired 
it); Christian County Clerk v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2013 WL 565198, 
slip op. No. 12-5237 (6th Cir. 2013) (dismissing case brought by county clerks in Kentucky 
seeking recording fees from MERS and banks); Montgomery County, Pennsylvania v. 
MERSCORP, Inc., 904 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D. Penn. 2012) (denying MERS’s motion to dismiss 
counties’ claim for recording fees). 
219 See, e.g., Christian County Clerk, 2013 WL 565198 (dismissing case brought by county clerks 
in Kentucky seeking recording fees from MERS and banks); Montgomery County, 904 F.Supp.2d 
436 (denying MERS’s motion to dismiss counties’ claim for recording fees). 
220 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-
39-001 (May 29, 1998). 
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generally indicates that the transaction was not a transfer.221 Case law and rulings 
do not expound on this factor, but its application appears to be straight forward. In 
the case of securitized mortgage notes, the obligors are the borrowers. The 
originators could notify the obligor of a transfer by direct communication or 
public notice. The originator arguably could provide public notice by recording 
the transfer in county records. Indeed, the purpose of recording transfers of 
mortgages is to put the public (including the obligor) on notice to prevent multiple 
claims for the same note.222 In fact, many of the legal conflicts arise because 
obligors are unsure of who holds the mortgage note and who has the right to bring 
foreclosure actions on the property. By failing to record the assignment of 
mortgages or providing other notification, the parties failed to notify the obligor 
of a transfer of the obligation. This factor suggests the RMBS trusts, including the 
hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the mortgage 
notes. 
 
(3)  Which party serviced the obligations? 
 
 The third factor considers which party serviced the obligations.223 
Generally, the originator, or an entity affiliated with the originator, services an 
RMBS trust’s mortgage notes.224 The originator’s continuing to service an 
obligation generally would indicate that the originator is the tax owner of the 
note.225  
 
(4)  Did payments to the transferee correspond to collections on the debt 
instruments? 
 
 The fourth factor is whether payments made to the purported transferee 
correspond to collections on the debt instrument.226 If payments to the transferee 
correspond to collections on the obligations, the transaction is more likely to be 
                                                 
221 See United Surgical Steel Co., 54 T.C. at 1230 (“As far as the customer knew, the [originator] 
was the person to whom he was indebted.”). 
222 See WOLF, supra note 47, § 37.27. 
223 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); Tech. Adv Memo. 98-39-001 
(May 29, 1998). 
224 See Kemp, 440 B.R. at 627 (providing that the PSA named Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., as 
originator and Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP (an affiliate of Countrywide Home Loans, 
Inc.) as servicer). 
225 See United Surgical Steel Co., 54 T.C. at 1229–30 (“The [originator] continued to handle all 
collections and otherwise to service its customers. In fact, there was no contact between the 
customer and the bank.”); Town & Country Food Co., 51 T.C. at 1057 (“[The originator] collected 
payments as they became due and deposited them in its own bank account.”). 
226 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-
39-001 (May 29, 1998). 
 
 
             REMIC TAX ENFORCEMENT AS FINANCIAL-MARKET REGULATOR            39 
 
 
  
 
treated as a transfer,227 but courts have stated that corresponding payments are not 
dispositive.228 PSAs generally required the originator (so long as it retains the 
servicing rights) to collect payments from obligors and deliver them to the RMBS 
trust or the RMBS investors net of appropriate fees,229 so if record-keeping was 
accurate and borrowers made scheduled payments on the notes, the payments to 
the transferee would generally correspond to collections. Such payments would 
therefore indicate that RMBS trusts were tax owners. 
PSAs also provide that originators are obligated to repurchase or replace 
defective loans.230 Sponsors would, however, not enforce repurchase obligations 
and would retain settlement payments paid by originators to compensate for 
defective mortgage notes.231 Repurchase payments are one type of payment on the 
loans, and the RMBS trusts would not receive those payments. Because payments 
to RMBS trusts did not correspond with the collections by the sponsor of 
repurchase settlement proceeds, such actions would suggest that some RMBS 
trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax 
owners of the mortgage notes. 
 
(5)  Did the transferee impose restrictions on the operations of the transferor 
that are consistent with a lender-borrower relationship? 
 
 The fifth factor considers whether the transferee imposes restrictions on 
the operations of the transfer that are consistent with a lender-borrower 
relationship.232 Case law holding that transactions were loans secured by notes 
and not transfers of the notes often considered the restrictions the lenders placed 
on the borrowers to help secure repayment of the loan and protect the collateral.233 
Such restrictions include keeping records in a manner that satisfies a lender; 
allowing the lender to audit the books of the borrower; furnishing financial 
statements to the lender periodically; paying taxes as they become due; keeping 
the collateral insured; requiring approval for other purchases; and restricting the 
payment of compensation, creation of other indebtedness, and the payment of 
                                                 
227 See Branham v. Comm’r, 51 T.C. 175, 180 (1968). 
228 See United Surgical Steel, 54 T.C. at 1228 (“[T]here is no basis in law upon which to conclude 
that merely because the amount borrowed is substantially equal to the face amount of the 
collateral, the taxpayer has thereby disposed of the collateral.”). 
229 See KRAVITT, supra note 52, § 4.02. 
230 See id. § 16.04. 
231 See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7, at 25–28. 
232 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); Tech. Adv Memo. 98-39-001 
(May 29, 1998). 
233 See, e.g., United Surgical Steel Co., 54 T.C. at 1230 (1970); Union Planters National Bank of 
Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d 115, 117, 18 (6th Cir. 1970); Yancey Bros. Co. v. United 
States, 319 F. Supp. 441, 446 (1970). 
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dividends.234 Distinctive restrictions also include margin account payment 
requirements and requirements to maintain a certain ratio of collateral to debt.235 
A borrower’s need to satisfy such requirements and ability to borrow additional 
funds using the same debt as collateral further evinces the arrangement is a loan, 
not a transfer.236 To apply this factor the analysis would consider whether the 
RMBS trust or sponsor (as potential lender) imposed such restrictions on the 
originator. PSAs do not appear to explicitly restrict the originator’s operations. 
Thus, this factor appears to indicate that RMBS trusts were tax owners of the 
mortgage notes. 
 
(6)  Which party had power of disposition? 
 
 The sixth factor considers who has the power to dispose of an 
obligation.237 The lack of restrictions on the sale of a note suggests power of 
disposition.238 Arrangements that clearly allowed one party to dispose of notes, 
even if in the possession of another party, also suggest power of disposition.239 
The rights to dispose of notes, to transfer the registration of the notes, and to keep 
interest due on the notes point to the person who has the power to dispose of 
notes.240 In cases that rely upon this factor, the originators of notes could dispose 
of the notes, if they replaced the collateral or had sufficient other collateral to 
secure the lender’s right to repayment.241 For example, a manufacturer could sell 
notes, if the value of the remaining notes it held were sufficient to satisfy the 
lender who held a security interest in the notes.242 In other cases, courts consider 
whether one party has complete dominion of an asset in determining power of 
                                                 
234 See United Surgical Steel Co. v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 1215, 1230 (1970). 
235 See Union Planters, 426 F.2d at 117, 118; Yancey Bros., 319 F. Supp. at 446. Margin account 
payment requirements serve to protect the lender where a borrower’s “security is decreasing in 
value.” Union Planters, 426 F.2d at 117. 
236 See Yancey Bros., 319 F. Supp. at 446. 
237 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); Tech. Adv Memo. 98-39-001 
(May 29, 1998). 
238 See Rev. Rul. 82-144, 1982-2 C.B. 34. 
239 See, e.g., Union Planters, 426 F.2d at 117 (holding that the owner was the party that listed the 
bonds for sale); American National Bank of Austin v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 
1070) (recognizing that dealers held complete dominion over bonds as they came into possession 
of the lending bank, and dealers could sell the bonds at any time to the dealers’ customers). 
240 See Calloway v. Comm’r, 691 F.3d 1315, 1319–34 (11th Cir. 2012); Sollberger v. Comm’r, 
691F.3d 1119, 1125–27 (9th Cir. 2012). 
241 See Town and Country Food Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 51 T.C. 1049. 
242 See id. 
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disposition.243 The RMBS arrangements do not squarely align with any of these 
cases. Neither the RMBS trusts, the originators, nor the sponsors appear to have 
had complete dominion over the mortgage notes. 
 Without possession of the mortgage notes, a person obviously cannot 
transfer possession of the notes. An RMBS trust that did not have possession of 
notes could sell the rights it had under the PSAs to receive payments, but it could 
not transfer all of the interests and rights in negotiable mortgage notes prior to 
taking possession of them.244 Therefore, an RMBS trust that lacks possession 
cannot transfer the negotiable note to someone who would become a holder in due 
course.245 A rational buyer would not pay fair market value for a negotiable note 
that did not bestow upon it rights of a holder in due course. Furthermore, the 
REMIC rules generally prohibit RMBS trusts from transferring any mortgage 
notes.246 PSAs also generally prohibit RMBS trusts from transferring any 
mortgage note they hold to ensure that they comply with the REMIC rules.247 
Thus, as a practical matter, RMBS trusts probably are not able to dispose of 
mortgage notes, which goes against the position that they are tax owners of the 
notes. 
 The originator and RMBS trust would confer very different rights upon 
potential purchasers of the notes. A person who purchased the note from the 
originator could become a holder of the note and be entitled to enforce it.248 In 
fact, the originator could sell an untransferred mortgage note to other purchasers 
                                                 
243 See Bailey v. Comm’r, 912 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the party that had the 
exclusive right in a film to control distribution, determine the title, date of initial release, advertise, 
make copies, possess, and distribute to various media was the owner of the film). 
244 See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REPORT ON 
APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES RELATING TO 
MORTGAGE NOTES (November 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Committees_Materials/PEBUCC/PEB_Report_111411.pdf 
(noting that pursuant to U.C.C. section 3-301, one must possess or have formerly possessed a note 
to be a person entitled to enforce it). The situation with non-negotiable notes is very different. See 
Dale A. Whitman & Drew Milner, Foreclosing on Nothing: The Curious Problem of the Deed of 
Trust Foreclosure Without Entitlement To Enforce the Note, 66 ARK. L. REV. 21, 27 (2013) (“It is 
clear that, unlike a negotiable instrument, enforcement rights in a nonnegotiable note can be 
transferred by a separate document of assignment.”). 
245 See U.C.C. § 1-201 (defining a “holder” as one in possession). 
246 See I.R.C. § 860F(a)(2). 
247 See, e.g., Pooling And Servicing Agreement for Long Beach Mortgage Loan Trust 2006-3 and 
Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2006-3, by and among Long Beach Securities Corp., Depositor, 
Long Beach Mortgage Company, Seller And Master Servicer and Deutsche Bank National Trust 
Company, Trustee (dated as of April 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355515/000127727706000388/psalongbeach_20063.pdf
. 
248 See U.C.C. § 3-301. 
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who could become a holder in due course of the mortgage note.249 A holder in due 
course who purchased a mortgage note from an originator following a purported 
transfer to an RMBS trust would have greater rights in a mortgage note than the 
RMBS trust.250 The RMBS trust’s recourse in such a situation would be against 
the originator for breach of contract and possibly theft.251 Thus, the originator 
who retains possession of a mortgage note has the power to dispose of the note, 
but the RMBS trust only has power to transfer some of the rights under the 
note.252 A good faith transferee of the mortgage note from the originator would 
have more rights than a good faith transferee of the RMBS trust’s rights in the 
note. In fact, as litigation proceeds and additional facts emerge, finding that 
originators sold single notes to multiple buyers would not be surprising.253 Neither 
originators nor RMBS trusts have carte blanche to dispose of the notes, so this 
factor does not appear to weigh conclusively in either direction. The factor is 
probably more damning for the RMBS trusts, however, because they are seeking 
tax ownership. 
 
(7)  Which party bears the risk of loss? 
 
                                                 
249 See U.C.C. § 3-302(a) (“‘holder in due course’” means the holder of an instrument if: (1) the 
instrument when issued or negotiated to the holder does not bear such apparent evidence of 
forgery or alteration or is not otherwise so irregular or incomplete as to call into question its 
authenticity; and (2) the holder took the instrument (i) for value, (ii) in good faith, (iii) without 
notice that the instrument is overdue or has been dishonored or that there is an uncured default 
with respect to payment of another instrument issued as part of the same series, (iv) without notice 
that the instrument contains an unauthorized signature or has been altered, (v) without notice of 
any claim to the instrument described in Section 3-306, and (vi) without notice that any party has a 
defense or claim in recoupment described in Section 3-305(a).”). 
250 See U.C.C. § 3-306 (“A person taking an instrument, other than a person having rights of a 
holder in due course, is subject to a claim of a property or possessory right in the instrument or its 
proceeds, including a claim to rescind a negotiation and to recover the instrument or its proceeds. 
A person having rights of a holder in due course takes free of the claim to the instrument.”). 
251 See KRAVITT, supra note 52, § 16.04. 
252 But see I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-52-002 (Sep. 16, 1985) (ruling privately that the facts and 
circumstances determined that the party in possession of assets was not the tax owner). The IRS 
also considers contractual repurchase agreements and tacit understanding of parties in determining 
who is the tax owner of an asset. See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-52-002 (Sep. 16, 1985). 
253 See id. (“Outright fraud is probably unlikely when the parties are well known to each other and 
a transaction is as highly publicized as a typical MBS offering. But the risk of an inadvertent 
retransfer of mortgage loans should not be lightly dismissed. The authors recall too many 
occasions on which a client called to report the discovery that assets purportedly transferred had 
been pledged or sold to another party. “). 
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 The seventh factor examines which party bears the risk of loss.254 This 
may be the most important factor in determining who is the tax owner of a 
mortgage note.255 In a private ruling, the IRS devoted considerable text to 
analyzing who bears the risk of loss in a loan securitization arrangement.256 The 
IRS identified both credit risk and prepayment risk as types of risk that 
accompany mortgage securitization.257 Credit risk is the risk that borrowers will 
not make payments as provided in the loan agreements.258 Prepayment risk is the 
risk that borrowers will refinance when interest rates go down and pay off 
existing mortgage notes before their maturity dates and that the holder of a note 
will hold a note with a below-market yield if the interest rates go up.259 Another 
risk of securitization is modification risk.260 Modification risk is the risk that the 
borrower will modify the loan to reduce the amount of monthly payments.261  
A mortgage securitization arrangement can transfer any combination of 
such risks from the originator or provide that the originator will retain any 
combination of the risks. For example, if the originator retains the most junior 
tranches of certificates issued with respect to an RMBS trust or it agrees to 
repurchase defective mortgages, it retains most of the credit risk.262 Many RMBS 
trusts had been structured this way,263 so originators often retain the credit risk by 
retaining junior RMBS tranches. The parties to a securitization arrangement can 
transfer the prepayment risk and modification risk to the holders of more senior 
tranches if they require RMBS trusts to use available funds to pay the holders of 
senior tranches first.264 In fact, the economic incentives that accompany the 
                                                 
254 I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); see I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-
39-001 (May 29, 1998). 
255 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
256 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-
39-001 (May 29, 1998). 
257 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
258 See id. 
259 See id. 
260 See Nuveen Investments, Prospectus for Nuveen Mortgage Opportunity Term Fund 2 82 (Feb. 
3, 2010), available at 
https://www2.morganstanley.com/wealth/Markets/IPOCenter/Prospectus/?DocID=p_JMTCE. 
261 See id. 
262 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
263 See Ingo Fender and Janet Mitchell, Incentives and Tranche Retention in Securitisation: A 
Screening Model 4 n.4 
(BIS Working Papers No 289, May, 2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/cbrworkshop09/fendermitchell.pdf (“[I]n early securitisations, 
originators would routinely hold on to the equity piece of their transactions. . . .. [E]quity tranches, 
even when originally retained, were increasingly sold or hedged”). 
264 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001) (ruling privately that a 
sufficient amount of the economic benefits and burdens transferred to warrant treating the 
arrangement as a transfer for tax purposes). 
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different types of risk affect investors’ behavior and preferences.265 Investors who 
hold senior RMBS tranches bear most of the prepayment risk; investors in junior 
tranches or the originator bear most of the credit risk.266 Margin accounts, 
repurchase agreements, and other mechanisms can also influence who bears the 
risk of loss.267 Thus, determining who bears the risk of loss is fact-specific.  
 The IRS privately ruled that in a non-REMIC mortgage securitization, the 
trust bore the prepayment risk and the originator bore the credit risk.268 Similarly, 
originators and REMICs each bear risk. Originators of the loans conveyed to 
many RMBS trusts agree to repurchase the mortgage notes that do not satisfy 
underwriting requirements.269 Indeed, originators created reserves to cover the 
estimated costs they would incur as a result of the risks they retained.270 Even 
though RMBS sponsors retained repurchase settlement payments,271 suggesting 
that the RMBS trust bore the risk of loss, courts will most likely hold the RMBS 
sponsors liable for paying those proceeds to the RMBS trusts. Courts will also 
likely enforce the PSAs and hold originators liable for repurchasing or replacing 
the defective mortgage notes. Thus, in the case of an RMBS trust knowingly 
formed with defective mortgage notes, the RMBS trust would not bear the risk of 
loss of the mortgage notes. Many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical 
second-lien mortgage RMBS trust, would not bear the risk of loss of mortgage 
notes. 
 
(8)  Which party had the potential for gain? 
 
 The eighth factor considers which party had the potential for gain.272 The 
IRS observed that the potential for gain is the obverse of bearing risk.273 
Consequently, one might conclude that if the originator or sponsor bore the risk of 
                                                 
265 See SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS, 60-62 (2012) (“What the FDIC staff understood early 
on—frankly, 
 before anyone else—was that the usual forces of economic self-interest would not result in the 
kind of wide-scale restructuring that was needed to avoid a massive wave of foreclosures. That 
was because through the securitization process, those who owned the mortgages were different 
from those who would be responsible for restructuring them and the legal contracts governing the 
modification process created economic incentives skewed in favor of foreclosure.”). 
266 See KRAVITT, supra note 52, § 16.02. 
267 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 140-144. 
268 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
269 See JOHN ARNHOLZ & EDWARD E. GAINOR, OFFERINGS OF ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES § 1.04 
(2013). 
270 See FESTA, supra note 11, § 7.01. 
271 See J. P. Morgan Securities Complaint, supra note 7. 
272 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.. 2001-30-2009 (Apr. 20, 2001); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-
39-001 (May 29, 1998). 
273 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem.. 2001-30-009 (Apr. 20, 2001). 
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loss, the RMBS trust might have the potential for gain. The application of this 
factor to RMBS trusts is unclear, especially if the parties wanted to qualify for 
REMIC classification. A REMIC does not have the opportunity to profit from the 
disposition of mortgage notes. If the notes appreciate in value and a REMIC were 
to sell the notes, any gain it recognizes would be taxed at 100%.274 Because the 
tax would consume any such gain, the REMICs have no potential for gain from 
the mortgage notes. The IRS has also concluded that if there is no real opportunity 
for gain, “who bears the risk of loss must determine whether the transaction is a 
sale or secured financing.”275 RMBS trusts appear to provide no real opportunity 
for lawfully acquired gain from the mortgage notes, so the focus is on the risk of 
loss instead of the potential for gain. Nonetheless, REMIC-intended RMBS trusts’ 
inability to profit from the disposition of mortgage notes suggests they are not the 
tax owners of the mortgage notes. 
 Table 1 summarizes the tax-ownership analysis of the hypothetical 
second-lien mortgage RMBS trust using the eight factors. The summary suggests 
that the IRS could make a very strong case that many RMBS trusts, and especially 
the second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax owners of the mortgage notes.  
 
Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical 
RMBS Trust 
       
Factor  RMBS Trust Owned the Note 
RMBS Trust Did 
Not Own the Note 
Direction 
Balance Leans 
(1) Did parties 
treat the 
transaction as a 
sale? 
PSA provided that 
originator 
transferred notes; 
federal tax 
accounting of 
interest and 
principal. 
Originators 
retained 
possession of 
notes; transfer not 
recorded; 
recording fees not 
paid; sponsor 
retained 
settlement 
payment. 
RMBS trust not 
tax owner. 
                                                 
274 See I.R.C. § 860F(a)(2)(A). 
275 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem.98-39-001 (May 29, 2012). 
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Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical 
RMBS Trust 
       
Factor  RMBS Trust Owned the Note 
RMBS Trust Did 
Not Own the Note 
Direction 
Balance Leans 
(2) Were obligors 
notified of transfer 
of obligation? 
Loan documents 
may provide for 
possibility of 
assignment. 
No public record 
of assignment; 
probably no direct 
notification. 
RMBS trust not 
tax owner. 
(3) Which party 
serviced the 
obligation? 
  Affiliate of 
originator serviced 
the obligation. 
RMBS trust not 
tax owner. 
(4) Did payments 
to the transferee 
correspond to 
collections on the 
debt instrument? 
Principal and 
interest payments 
to RMBS trust 
corresponded to 
collections. 
Settlement 
payments for 
defective loans did 
not correspond to 
sponsor’s 
collection of those 
payments. 
Not apparent. 
(5) Did the 
transferee impose 
restrictions on the 
operations of the 
transferor? 
No distinctive 
restrictions 
imposed. 
  RMBS trust tax 
owner. 
(6) Which party 
had power of 
disposition? 
Originator could 
transfer possession 
of the notes. 
PSA restricted 
RMBS trust’s right 
to transfer notes; 
tax law penalizes 
transfers; RMBS 
trust did not have 
possession of 
notes. 
Not apparent. 
(7) Which party 
bears the risk of 
loss? 
  PSA obligated 
trust to cure 
defective loans, 
and many loans 
were defective. 
RMBS trust not 
tax owner. 
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Table 1: Summary of Factors Applied to Hypothetical 
RMBS Trust 
       
Factor  RMBS Trust Owned the Note 
RMBS Trust Did 
Not Own the Note 
Direction 
Balance Leans 
(8) Which party has 
the potential for 
gain? 
Originator could 
not dispose of 
mortgage notes for 
gain. 
100% tax on gains 
from dispositions 
prohibits RMBS 
trust from 
realizing gain. 
RMBS trust not 
tax owner. 
 
 In addition to applying the multiple-factor test for tax ownership to 
mortgage notes, the courts and IRS may also estop purported RMBS trusts from 
arguing that they are owners of notes that they do not possess. Courts and the IRS 
apply a substance-over-form doctrine to disregard the form taxpayers choose, if 
the form does not reflect the economic substance of the transaction.276 They 
generally do not, however, allow taxpayers to rely upon a substance argument to 
take a position that differs from the taxpayer’s chosen form.277 If RMBS trusts 
and originators chose not to transfer the mortgage notes to the RMBS trusts, the 
principle of estoppel weakens RMBS trusts’ arguments that they were tax owners 
of notes of which they chose not to take possession. 
 Commentators anticipate that RMBS trusts may argue that the REMIC 
rules merely require the REMIC to be the beneficial owner of the obligations.278 
                                                 
276 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
277 See, e.g., Branham v. Comm’r, 51. T.C. 175 (1968) (finding that the taxpayer’s assignment of a 
note was “absolute on its face” and holding that the taxpayer had transferred the note); I.R.S. 
Tech. Adv. Mem. 98-39-001 (May 29, 1998) (“Taxpayer would be bound by the form of its 
transactions if it were the first to assert that its transactions were [something other than the chosen 
form]”). 
278 See, e.g., Borden & Reiss, supra note 158 at 278; Lee A. Sheppard, The Crazy Train of 
Mortgage Securitization, TAX NOTES 639, 645 (Nov. 8, 2010). Beneficial ownership often appears 
in the trust context, but even in that context, it closely relates to the concept of tax ownership. See, 
e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (8th ed. 2004) (defining beneficial owner as “[o]ne 
recognized in equity as the owner of something because use and title belong to that person, even 
though legal title may belong to someone else; esp., one for whom property is held in trust.”). The 
tax statute provides that qualified mortgage includes “any participation or certificate of beneficial 
ownership” in an obligation. See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A). The REMIC regulations refer to 
beneficial ownership in two places. First, they prohibit a disqualified organization from acquiring 
beneficial ownership of a residual interest in a REMIC. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(5)(i)(B). 
That reference does not, of course, address the tax ownership of an obligation. Second, they 
provide that the definition of “obligations secured by interests in real property” includes “other 
investment trust interests that represent undivided beneficial ownership in a pool of obligations 
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That argument is meaningless because beneficial ownership is analogous to tax 
ownership, and courts apply the Grodt & McKay benefits and burdens test to 
determine who is the beneficial owner of property.279 In fact, defendants in 
upstream litigation acknowledge that tax ownership is the appropriate test to 
apply in determining whether a purported REMIC is the owner of the 
obligations.280 Beneficial ownership would be relevant to an RMBS trust only if 
the originator held the mortgage note in trust for the RMBS trust.281  
 If an RMBS trust fails to establish that it is the tax owner of mortgage 
notes, tax law must recharacterize the arrangement. If a purported REMIC 
                                                                                                                                     
principally secured by interests in real property and related assets that would be considered to be 
permitted investments if the investment trust were a REMIC.” See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(5). 
That reference is clearly to an interest in a trust. If the originator holds the mortgage notes, a 
purported REMIC would have to establish that the originator held the mortgage notes in trust and 
that the trust was an investment trust to rely upon that rule. The documents used to create the 
REMICs do not appear to make any provisions for the originator to be trustee, and the originators 
probably would not come within the definition of investment trust. Furthermore, such a claim 
would contradict representations in the REMIC offering documents, which did not provide that the 
originator would hold the mortgage notes in trust. 
279 See, e.g., Estate of Kenneth L. Lay v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2011-208, 102 T.C.M. 202 (2011) 
(CCH) (“The status of the legal title to the annuity contracts does not control in determining 
whether a sale occurred. Beneficial ownership, and not legal title, determines ownership for 
Federal income tax purposes. Ragghianti v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 346 (1978), aff’d, without 
published opinion, 652 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1981); Pac. Coast Music Jobbers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 
55 T.C. 866, 874 (1971), aff’d., 457 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1972). The Federal income tax 
consequences of property ownership generally depend upon beneficial ownership, rather than 
possession of mere legal title. Speca v. Commissioner, 630 F.2d 554, 556-557 (7th Cir. 1980), 
aff’g T.C. Memo. 1979-120; Beirne v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 268, 277 (1973). “'[C]ommand over 
property or enjoyment of its economic benefits' * * *, which is the mark of true ownership, is a 
question of fact to be determined from all of the attendant facts and circumstances.” Monahan v. 
Commissioner, 109 T.C. 235, 240 (1997) (quoting Hang v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 74, 80 (1990)). 
This Court has stated that “a sale occurs upon the transfer of the benefits and burdens of 
ownership rather than upon the satisfaction of the technical requirements for the passage of title 
under State law.” Houchins v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 570, 590 (1982). The determination of 
whether the benefits and burdens of ownership have been transferred is one of fact and is based on 
the intention of the parties, evidenced by their written agreements and the surrounding facts and 
circumstances. Paccar, Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 754, 777 (1985), aff’d., 849 F.2d 
393 (9th Cir. 1988); Grodt & McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. at 1237; Ragghianti, 
71 T.C. at 349. Beneficial ownership is marked by command over property or enjoyment of its 
economic benefits. Yelencsics v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1513, 1527 (1980) (stock was sold in 
accordance with an agreement for the sale, even though the title to the stock was not transferred, in 
accordance with the agreement of the parties).”).  
280 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, HSH 
Nordbank v. Barclays Bank PLC, No. 652678/2011, at 24 n. 38 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County May 11, 
2012), available at 
https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/fbem/DocumentDisplayServlet?documentId=xKBnC5REEodDnG7
SCCByTg==&system=prod. 
281 See supra note 278. 
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received and distributed proceeds, it would clearly own some sort of asset capable 
of generating cash flow. That asset could be a loan from the originator, the 
sponsor, or other party to the securitization. The security for such a loan could be 
mortgage notes that would come within the definition of qualified mortgage. But 
such a loan does not itself come within the definition of qualified mortgage.282 
Because the asset would be something other than a qualified mortgage, the 
arrangement would fail to be a REMIC.  
 This analysis suggests that a court would likely find that many RMBS 
trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust, were not the tax 
owners of mortgage notes. The facts of some RMBS trusts may nonetheless 
indicate that the RMBS trust is the tax owner of the mortgage notes. In such cases 
the RMBS trusts may still fail to qualify as REMICs because they fail to satisfy 
the other REMIC requirements. As the following analysis indicates, the 
hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust will almost certainly fail to satisfy the other 
REMIC requirements. The analysis also provides a template analyzing the 
REMIC classification of other RMBS trusts 
 
B. Qualified Mortgage Requirement 
 
An RMBS trust must satisfy the qualified mortgage requirement to be a 
REMIC.283 A qualified mortgage is an obligation that is principally secured by an 
interest in real property.284 That definition has three elements: (1) obligation, (2) 
principally secured, and (3) secured by an interest in real property. An asset must 
satisfy all three elements to come within the definition of qualified mortgage. 
Many of the assets in RMBS trusts will not come within that definition. 
 
1. Obligation 
 
A qualified mortgage must be an “obligation (including any participation 
or certificate of beneficial ownership therein).”285 The REMIC rules do not 
specifically define obligation. The common legal definition of obligation is “[a] 
legal or moral duty to do or not do something . . . . A formal, binding agreement 
or acknowledgment of a liability to pay a certain amount or to do a certain thing 
for a particular person or set of persons; esp., a duty arising by contract.”286 A 
mortgage note would satisfy this definition of obligation because the maker of the 
note agrees to pay a certain amount. An originator’s promise under a PSA to 
                                                 
282 See infra text accompanying notes 284-285. 
283 See supra text accompanying notes 151-153. 
284 See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A). 
285 See id. 
286 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1104 (8th ed. 2004). 
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transfer mortgage notes would also come within the definition of obligation. 
Participation or certificates of beneficial ownership in an obligation include “non-
REMIC pass-through certificates (including senior and subordinated pass-through 
certificates and IO [Interest Only] and PO [Principal Only] strips). . . .”287 A pass-
through certificate is an interest in a trust or other arrangement that holds a pool 
of mortgage notes or other debt instruments.288 IO and PO strips are types of 
stripped bonds and coupons governed by section 1286 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which grant a holder the rights to identified payments on bonds.289 Thus, a 
strip that grants an RMBS trust the right to receive certain payments due on an 
obligation principally secured by an interest in real property would appear to 
satisfy the definition of obligation. These rules are consistent with the general 
definition of qualified mortgage, which includes any regular interest in another 
REMIC.290 
Because RMBS trusts received cash flow, they must have been the tax 
owners of some type of property. Even if the property RMBS trusts owned was 
not qualified mortgages, it could have been an obligation. For instance, it could be 
an obligation from the originator to transfer mortgage notes and to transfer 
payments on the notes. Such an obligation would not be a pass-through certificate, 
however, unless the arrangement with the originator was a trust, which would not 
appear to be the case because PSAs do not appear to create a trust on behalf of the 
RMBS trust.291 Thus, the property owned by RMBS trusts would appear to be 
either mortgage notes, for RMBS trusts that are the tax owners of the notes, or the 
right to receive something from the originator. The property owned by an RMBS 
trust could, therefore, be some kind of binding obligation, even if it is not 
mortgage notes per se. Obligations in a form other than mortgage notes would 
not, however, satisfy other elements of the definition of qualified mortgage. In 
particular, such other obligation would not be principally secured by an interest in 
real property.  
 
2. Principally Secured 
 
 An obligation is principally secured only if it (1) satisfies the 80% test, (2) 
satisfies the alternative test, or (3) comes within the reasonable-belief safe 
harbor.292 As the following discussion illustrates, the lending and underwriting 
                                                 
287 See Peaslee & Nirenberg, supra note 166, at 456. 
288 See id. at 23.  
289 See id. at 438. A stripped bond is a bond that separates the ownership of the bond from any 
coupons or interest that have not yet come due, and a stripped coupon is the coupon related to the 
bond. See id. at 701. 
290 See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(C). 
291 See Borden & Reiss, supra note 13, at 277-279. 
292 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1). 
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practices during the years leading up to the Financial Crisis will prohibit many 
mortgage notes from being principally secured under any of those three 
alternatives. Any other obligation that an RMBS trust might hold would also fail 
to satisfy any one of the tests. 
 
a. The 80% Test 
 
 An obligation satisfies the 80% test only if the fair market value of the 
interest in real property securing the obligation is at least 80% of the adjusted 
issue price of the obligation on one of the following two dates: (1) the obligation’s 
origination date,293 or (2) the date the trust acquires the obligation by 
contribution.294 In other words, the 80% test compares the value of the collateral 
to the amount of a loan, so it considers the value-to-loan (VTL) ratio of a 
mortgage note. Notice that the VTL ratio is the inverse of the LTV ratio that 
RMBS sponsors and investors use. The 80% test requires the VTL ratio of a loan 
to be at least 80%. Two definitions are key to computing the VTL ratio—the 
definition of adjusted issue price and the definition of the fair market value of the 
collateral.  
 The REMIC rules do not appear to define adjusted issue price of an 
obligation. Instead, the rules appear to rely upon the definition “adjusted issue 
price” in other areas of tax law, in particular in the original issue discount (OID) 
rules.295 One such definition provides that the adjusted issue price of a debt 
instrument is the instrument’s issue price at the beginning of its first accrual 
period.296 The issue price for a home mortgage should be the amount of the 
loan.297 After the first accrual period, the adjusted issue price is the issue price 
increased by any original issue discount that any holder of the instrument included 
in income and decreased by any payments other than qualified stated interest 
made on the instrument.298 The adjustments that occur between the origination of 
a loan and a transfer of it to an RMBS trust normally should not significantly 
affect the adjusted issue price of the mortgage note because the transfers generally 
                                                 
293 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i)(A). If an obligation is significantly modified before the 
REMIC acquires it, its origination date is the date of the modification. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-
2(b)(1). 
294 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i)(B). 
295 See Peaslee & Nirenberg, supra note 166, at 455, 58. 
296 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1). 
297 See I.R.C. § 1273(b)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(g)(5), Example 1 (deducting points from the 
borrower’s payment to determine issue price). 
298 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(1)(i), (ii). 
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occur shortly after origination.299 Therefore, this analysis assumes that the 
adjusted issue price is the amount of the loan. 
 The definition of fair market value in the 80% test applies on a property-
by-property basis. The test assigns the value of property first to senior liens. The 
amount assigned to senior liens reduces the fair market value of the interest in real 
property assigned to other liens.300 Other liens that are on par with the obligation 
being tested further reduce the fair market value of the interest in real property in 
proportion to the liens with similar priority.301 The computation of fair market 
value required by these rules could cause many second-lien mortgages (and 
primary mortgages for that matter) to fail to satisfy the 80% test. Inflated 
appraisals were common in years leading up to the Financial Crisis,302 and will 
thus cause many mortgages to fail the 80% test.  
 An example illustrates how senior liens can cause many second and other 
subordinate liens to fail the 80% test. Assume the originator of an obligation treats 
an appraised value of $250,000 as the fair market value of a house. Based upon 
that appraisal, the originator lends a buyer $200,000 secured by a first-lien 
mortgage on the house and $37,500 secured by a second-lien mortgage on the 
house (the borrower paid the remaining $12,500 of the purchase price).303 The 
appraised fair market value suggests that both the first and the second mortgages 
satisfy the 80% test. For purposes of applying the test to the first mortgage, the 
fair market value of the house would be the full $250,000. The VTL ratio of the 
first mortgage would therefore be the $250,000 appraised value divided by the 
$200,000 mortgage or 125%, which is obviously greater than the required 80%. 
Because the VTL ratio is greater than 80%, the first-lien mortgage satisfies the 
80% test. The fair market value apportioned to the second-lien mortgage for 
purposes of the 80% test would be $50,000 ($250,000 total fair market value 
minus the $200,000 first mortgage). The VTL ratio for the second mortgage 
would therefore be 133% ($50,000 fair market value to $37,500 loan). Because 
133% is obviously greater than the required 80%, the second mortgage would also 
appear to satisfy the 80% test.  
 Assume that because appraisers overstated the values of homes, the 
$250,000 appraised value is significantly higher than the property’s actual value. 
The actual value of the house is $225,000 (just 90% of the appraised value) at the 
                                                 
299 See supra text accompanying note 152. Of course, failed underwriting could affect the value 
and original discount of a loan. See supra text accompanying notes 120-126. 
300 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1275-1(b)(2). 
301 See id. 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 120-126. 
303 The issuance of a first and second mortgage to home purchasers was typical during the period 
leading up to the economic meltdown in 2008. See Vikas Bajaj, Equity Loans as Next Round in 
Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (no page) (Mar. 27, 2008), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/27/business/27loan.html?pagewanted=print.  
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time the buyer borrowed the first or second mortgage.304 The actual value, not the 
inflated appraised value, is appropriate for the 80% test.305 Using the actual value 
of the collateral, the first-lien mortgage would still satisfy the 80% test because it 
would use the full $225,000 actual fair market value, which exceeds the $200,000 
first mortgage. The VTL ratio for the first mortgage would be 112.5% ($225,000 
value divided by the $200,000 loan). The value for purposes of the second 
mortgage, however, would be the $225,000 actual value minus the $200,000 first-
lien mortgage, or $25,000. The VTL ratio for the $37,500 second mortgage using 
that $25,000 value would be 67% ($25,000 value divided by the $37,500 loan). 
Because the 67% VTL ratio of the second-lien mortgage is less than the required 
80% VTL ratio, the second-lien mortgage would not satisfy the 80% test. 
 Studies of mortgages suggest that more than a significant percentage of 
second-lien mortgage loans would not satisfy the 80% test.306 For example, a 
                                                 
304 The $250,000 appraised value represents approximately 11% overstated value ($25,000 ÷ 
$225,000). Such inflation was not uncommon leading up to the Financial Crisis. See supra text 
accompanying notes 120-126 (claiming that appraisals often overstated values by as much as 10% 
on a cumulative basis). 
305 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(i) (referring to fair market value of the collateral). 
306 It was not uncommon for homebuyers to borrow close to 100% of the appraised value of the 
home. See Dov Solomon & Odelia Minnes, Non-Recourse, No Down Payment and the Mortgage 
Meltdown: Lessons from Undercapitalization, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 529, 541-542 
(2011). For example, a borrower might take a first mortgage for 80% of the appraised value of the 
home and a second mortgage for 20% of the appraised value of the home (an 80-20 financing). 
Assuming the first mortgage was 80% of the value of the home and a second mortgage was 20% 
of the value of the home with such arrangements, a 4.001% discrepancy between the appraised 
value and the actual value would cause the second mortgage to fail the 80% test. For instance, if 
the appraised value of a home was $100,000, the second mortgage would be for $20,000. The 
VTL ratio of the second home would be less than 80% if the actual value of the home was only 
$95,999 instead of the appraised $100,000. If the actual value were $95,999, to value assigned to 
the $20,000 second mortgage for the purpose of the 80% test would be $15,999 ($95,999 total 
actual value minus the $80,000 first mortgage). The VTL ratio of the second mortgage in such a 
situation would be 79.995% ($15,999 value to $20,000 loan). These calculations suggest that if the 
appraised value was just 4.2% greater than the actual value ($4,001 ÷ $95,999), the second 
mortgage on a 100%-financed home would not satisfy the 80% test. Based upon reports that 
appraised values were often at least 20% greater than the actual value of the homes, many 
mortgages would fail to satisfy the 80% test. See, e.g., Griffin, & Maturana, supra note 3 (finding 
that appraisal overstatements of at least 20% occurred in 14.5% of studied loans). 
Instead of being an 80-20 arrangement, the arrangement could have been an 80-10-10 
arrangement with a first mortgage equal to 80% of the home’s appraised value and a second and 
third mortgage each equal to 10% of the home’s appraised value. If the first and second mortgage 
had priority over the third, the third mortgage would not satisfy the 80% if the actual value was 
only 2.01% less than the appraised value. To illustrate, a homebuyer would borrow $100,000 to 
purchase a home with an appraised value of $100,000. The third mortgage in an 80-10-10 
arrangement would be $10,000. The third mortgage would not satisfy the 80% test if the value of 
the property were less than $98,000 because the actual value assigned to the third mortgage would 
be the $97,999 (for example) actual value minus the $90,000 total amount of the first and second 
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study examining combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios of pooled mortgages 
indicates that many loans held by RMBS trusts may not satisfy the 80% test.307 
The CLTV ratio compares the combined principal balance of all liens on the 
mortgaged property to the value of the mortgaged property.308 Because LTV is the 
inverse of the VTL ratio, a VTL ratio of 80% equals an LTV ratio of 125%.309 To 
illustrate, assume a property with an $80,000 fair market value secures a $100,000 
loan. The VTL ratio for that property and obligation would be 80% ($80,000 
value divided by the $100,000 loan). The LTV ratio for that property and 
obligation would, however, be 125% ($100,000 loan divided by the $80,000 
value). If the VTL ratio of a property and obligation is less than 80%, the 
obligation will not satisfy the 80% test. Inversely, if the LTV of a property is 
greater than 125%, the obligation secured by the property will not satisfy the 80% 
test. For instance, if the property’s value was $78,000, the VTL ratio would be 
78% ($78,000 value divided by the $100,000 loan), and the LTV ratio would be 
about 128% ($100,000 loan divided by $78,000 value). This illustrates the inverse 
relationship of the VTL and the LTV ratios. To pass the 80% test, a loan’s VTL 
ratio must be greater than or equal to 80%, and, inversely, the LTV ratio of a loan 
must be less than or equal to 125%.  
 The CLTV ratio includes all mortgages secured by a piece of property, but 
it does not provide information with respect to individual loans.310 A study found 
that the CLTV ratio was greater than 100% for as many as 34% of the loans in 
one RMBS trust.311 A CLTV of greater than 100% suggests that any secondary-
lien mortgages in the pool may not satisfy the 80% test. The CLTV ratio 
considers all loans that a single property secures. For instance, in the example 
                                                                                                                                     
mortgages, which would make the VTL ratio for the third mortgage less than 80% (e.g., $7,999 
actual to a $10,000 loan is a only 79.99% VTL ratio). 
 If the mortgages in an 80-20 or 90-10-10 had equal priority, the actual value of the 
property would have to be less than 80% of the appraised value for any mortgage to fail the 80% 
test. For instance, the value assigned to the 80% loan in a $100,000 80-20 arrangement would be 
80% of the actual value of the property, and the value assigned to the 20% loan would be 20% of 
the value of the property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(2). If the actual value of the property 
were $90,000 (90% of the appraised value), $72,000 of it would be assigned to the 80% loan, 
which would have been for $80,000, so the VTL ration would be 90% ($72,000 of value to 
$80,000 of mortgage). The VTL ratio for the $20,000 second mortgage would also be 90% 
because $18,000 (20% of $90,000) of the value would be assigned to it. 
 A diversified mortgage pool that has a ratio of first and subsequent mortgages that equals 
the ratio of such mortgages to the value of appraised property would most likely have more than a 
de minimis amount of mortgages that fail the 80% test. 
307 Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 28. 
308 See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 26. 
309 See Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, 57 F.R. 61293, T.D. 8458 (Dec. 24, 1992). 
310 The CLTV ratio would also consider third mortgages and any other mortgages secured by the 
property. 
311 See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 28. 
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above, if the house secured a $200,000 first-lien mortgage and a $37,500 second-
lien mortgage, the combined loans would be $237,500. If the value of the house 
were $250,000, the CLTV ratio for the property and obligations would be about 
95% ($237,500 loan divided by $250,000 value). The VTL ratio of the aggregate 
loans would be about 91% ($250,000 value divided by the $237,500 loan). If, 
however, the value of the property were only $225,000, the CLTV ratio would be 
slightly above 100% at about 106% ($237,500 loan divided by $225,000 value). 
The VLT ratio of the aggregate loans would be about 95% ($225,000 value 
divided by the $237,000 loan). Nonetheless, the loan-by-loan analysis shows that 
some loans may not satisfy the 80% test. 
 Because each loan is subject to the 80% test, a CLTV ratio of greater than 
100% signals that one or more of the loans secured by the property may fail the 
80% test. Failure will often result because the fair market value of the property 
apportioned to the first-lien mortgage leaves a disproportionately small amount of 
the property value to apportion to the other mortgages. If the first mortgage is for 
$200,000 (roughly 84% of the total amount of loans) and the actual value of the 
property is only $225,000, the first-lien mortgage is almost 89% of the actual 
value of the property. Thus, only 11% of the value of the property is apportioned 
to the second-lien mortgage for purposes of applying the 80% test to the second 
mortgage. The disproportionately small amount of value assigned to the second-
lien mortgage gives it a 150% LTV ratio ($37,500 loan divided by the $25,000 
value) and a 67% VTL ratio ($25,000 value divided by the $37,500 loan). The 
second-lien mortgage therefore would not satisfy the 80% test. In fact, loans with 
lower priority that are part of a CLTV ratio that exceeds 100% would often fail 
the 80% test.312 
 The study of CLTV ratios demonstrates that as many as 34% of randomly 
selected loans have CLTV ratios of greater than 100%.313 The percent of loans in 
an RMBS trust of second-lien mortgages with LTV ratios of greater than 100% 
would most likely be even higher, and that fact does not bode well for REMIC 
classification. For example, assume a trust holds $100,000,000 of loans, and the 
CLTV ratio for 34% of the loans (based upon actual value) is greater than 100%. 
With respect to $34,000,000 or 34% of the loans, a question arises about whether 
some of them fail the 80% test. Assume that $5,100,000 or 15% of the loans 
(based upon actual value) in that group are second-lien mortgages. If half of those 
                                                 
312 See supra note 306 (applying the 80% test to arrangements with a single property securing 
multiple loans). As illustrated in that discussion, the structure of the arrangement will often 
influence the effect of the 80% test. If all loans secured by a piece of property have equal priority, 
the CLTV ratio would have to be greater than 125% for any of the loans to fail the 80% test. If one 
or more loans have priority over other loans, a CLTV ratio of greater than 100% signals that one 
more of the loans probably does not satisfy the 80% test. 
313 See Nordbank Consolidated Complaint, supra note 93, at 28. 
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loans fail the 80% test, $2,550,000 or 2.55% of the loans in the portfolio would 
fail the 80% test. Based on the assumptions in this analysis, 2.55% of the loans in 
the portfolio would not be principally secured by an interest in real property under 
the 80% test. The percentage of mortgage notes that fail the 80% test would be 
even greater for RMBS trusts that held only second-lien mortgage notes.  
 As stated above, originators pressured appraisers to inflate values 80% of 
the time.314 That practice suggests that the value of collateral could have been 
overstated for at least 80% of the second-lien loans. Because the effect of 
overstated value of the collateral is magnified with respect to second-lien 
mortgages, as many as 80% of the second-lien mortgages could have VTL ratios 
that are less than 80%. If that is the case, the vast majority of second-lien 
mortgages granted in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis would not pass 
the 80% test. Such loans would be principally secured only if they pass the 
alternative test or come within the principally-secured safe harbor. 
 
b. The Alternative Test 
 
 An obligation that does not satisfy the 80% test will nonetheless be 
principally secured by an interest in real property if it satisfies the alternative test. 
To satisfy the alternative test an obligation must meet two requirements.315 First, 
substantially all of the proceeds of the obligation must be used by the borrower to 
acquire, improve, or protect an interest in real property.316 Second, at the 
origination date, the only security for the obligation can be the property that the 
borrower acquired, improved, and protected with the loan proceeds.317 The 
purpose of this test is to cover real estate construction or acquisition loans for 
property for which an appraisal was not obtained at the time of the loan.318  
The language in the preamble to the regulations raised the question of 
whether a loan for appraised property can satisfy the alternative test if it fails the 
80% test. That language provides: “[A] home improvement loan made in 
accordance with Title I of the National Housing Act would be considered to 
satisfy the principally secured standard even though one cannot readily 
demonstrate that the loan satisfied the 80-percent test because a property appraisal 
was not required at the time the loan was originated.”319 That language suggests 
that the alternative test was meant only for loans that did not require an appraisal 
                                                 
314 See supra text accompanying notes 123. 
315 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(1)(ii). 
316 See id. 
317 See id. 
318 See Peaslee & Nirenberg, supra note 166, at 459. 
319 See Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits, 57 F.R. 61293, 61294, T.D. 8458 (Dec. 24, 
1992). 
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of the collateral. It does not appear to be a fall back test for loans that fail the 80% 
test based on an inaccurate property value. If the collateral were appraised, the 
80% test would appear to be the proper test. Thus, any loan that included an 
appraisal value of the property and fails the 80% test probably cannot rely upon 
the alternative test. 
Many loans issued prior to the Financial Crisis will not satisfy the 
alternative test. During that period, many borrowers used proceeds from home 
equity loans for purposes other than acquiring, improving, and protecting interests 
in real property. Estimates indicate that as many as 40% of loans issued during 
years prior to the Financial Crisis were home equity loans that were not used to 
acquire, improve, or protect real property.320 Many such home equity loans would 
not satisfy the first part of the alternative test. Another common practice was for 
borrowers to take a portion of a loan originated at the time of purchase in cash.321 
If the amount of cash that the borrower received (or used for purposes other than 
to acquire, improve, or protect the real property) caused the portion used to 
acquire, improve, or protect the property to be less than substantial, the loan 
would not satisfy the alternative test. 
 A loan will also fail to satisfy the alternative test if property other than the 
real property that borrower acquired, improved, or protected with the loan 
proceeds, secures the loan. A borrower’s personal liability for the obligation does 
not violate this rule.322 If the borrower offers other property as collateral, 
however, the loan would not satisfy this requirement. Determining whether loans 
are secured by other property requires an examination of each loan. Even without 
that examination many second-lien mortgage notes in RMBS trusts will fail the 
alternative test because borrowers used the proceeds for purposes other than 
acquiring, improving, or protecting the property,323 and they obtained appraisals 
(albeit inaccurate appraisals) for the property, suggesting the test probably should 
not apply. Consequently, especially with respect to many second-lien mortgage 
notes, the mortgage notes will not satisfy the alternative test. 
                                                 
320 See Atif R. Mian & Amir Sufi, House Prices, Home Equity-Based Borrowing, and the U.S. 
Household Leverage Crisis (Research Paper, May 21, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397607 (“[O]ur findings are suggestive that a large fraction of home 
equity-based borrowing is used for consumption or home improvement. This conclusion is 
consistent with survey evidence by Brady, Canner, and Maki (2000) who find that from 1998 to 
1999, 40% of households cite home improvement as a reason for home equity extraction, and 39% 
cite consumer expenditures.”). 
321 See Hui Chen et al., Houses as ATMs? Mortgage Refinancing and Macroeconomic Uncertainty 
2 (Working Paper, June 21, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2024392 (“[A] large 
fraction of refinance loans--on average about 70%-- involve ‘cash-out,’ i.e. an increase in the loan 
balance and the corresponding decrease in home equity. Over the period from 1993 through 2010 
U.S. households extracted over $1.7 trillion of home equity via refinancing”). 
322 See Treas. Reg. § 860G-2(a)(1)(ii). 
323 See supra note 321. 
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c. The Reasonable-Belief Safe Harbor 
 
 Obligations that fail both the 80% test and the alternative test will 
nonetheless be principally secured by an interest in real property if they come 
within the reasonable-belief safe harbor. The reasonable-belief safe harbor treats 
an obligation as being principally secured by an interest in real property if, at the 
time the sponsor contributes the obligation to a REMIC, the sponsor reasonably 
believes the obligation satisfies the 80% test or the alternative test.324 The 
regulations provide two methods for establishing that reasonable belief. First, a 
sponsor may base reasonable belief on representations and warranties made by the 
originator.325 Second, a sponsor may base a reasonable belief on evidence 
indicating that the originator typically made mortgages in accordance with an 
established set of parameters, and that any mortgage loan originated in accordance 
with those parameters would satisfy the 80% test or the alternative test.326 The 
rules also provide that the safe harbor does not apply if the sponsor actually knew 
or had reason to know an obligation fails both the 80% test and the alternative 
test.327 Thus, in addition to showing reasonable belief, the sponsor must be able to 
show lack of actual knowledge and lack of reason to know that an obligation does 
not meet one of the other tests for the obligation to qualify for safe harbor 
protection.  
Sponsors’ only hope to come within the reasonable-belief safe harbor is to 
demonstrate that they based their reasonable belief on representations and 
warranties made by the originator. They could not argue that they based their 
reasonable belief on evidence indicating originators made mortgages in 
accordance with established parameters that would satisfy the 80% test. Evidence 
at the time indicated that originators had abandoned underwriting guidelines and 
made loans that could not satisfy the 80% test.328 Sponsors also knew or had 
reason to know that loans they were securitizing could not pass the 80% test. In 
the years leading up to the Financial Crisis, sponsors acknowledged the low 
quality of the mortgages that they were securitizing.329 Nonetheless, they 
continued to put them into RMBS trusts.330 
 If, despite the sponsors’ reasonable belief that the notes satisfied the 80% 
or alternative test, a purported REMIC later discovers an obligation is not 
                                                 
324 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(i). 
325 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(ii)(A). 
326 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(ii)(B). 
327 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(i). 
328 See supra text accompanying notes 306. 
329 See supra text accompanying notes 104. 
330 See id. 
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principally secured by an interest in real property, the obligation is defective and 
loses qualified mortgage status within 90 days after the date the purported REMIC 
discovers the defect.331 Thus, the rules give sponsors 90 days to cure defective 
loans.332 The sponsors appeared to have known that they were transferring 
defective loans into RMBS trusts at the time they formed the trusts. They knew 
that default rates of loans from particular originators were particularly high, but 
they continued to accept loans from those originators.333 They were similarly 
aware that appraisers were overstating the value of homes,334 so they knew that 
many loans could not satisfy the 80% test. Surely members of the industry had to 
know before reporters became aware that the mortgages and notes had serious 
quality problems. Even though REMICs have the opportunity to cure defective 
obligations within the 90-day window,335 nothing suggests that they took the steps 
necessary to cure defective obligations. In fact, due to the collapse of the 
residential real estate market as a result of the practices of RMBS sponsors, 
insufficient mortgages existed to replace defectives obligations that the RMBS 
trusts held. Also, sponsors colluded with originators to settle repurchase 
obligations instead of exercising the trusts’ rights to cure defects by replacing 
defective obligations with compliant loans.336 Consequently, the cure alternative 
would not appear to help RMBS trusts establish that their notes were principally 
secured. Thus, many of the mortgage notes that RMBS trusts claimed to own will 
not be principally secured. The percentage of mortgage notes that fail to be 
principally secured will probably be significant for second-lien mortgage RMBS 
trusts. 
  
3. Secured By Real Property 
 
 In addition to being principally secured, an obligation held by an RMBS 
trust must be secured by an interest in real property to come within the definition 
of qualified mortgage.337 The regulations do not specifically define “secured by,” 
but they provide a list of instruments that are secured by interests in real property. 
Those instruments include mortgages, deeds of trust, installment land contracts; 
mortgage pass-thru certificates guaranteed by GNMA, FNMA, FHLMC, or 
CMHC; other investment trust interests; and obligations secured by manufactured 
housing.338 Of the items in the list, mortgages and deeds of trust would most often 
                                                 
331 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(3)(iii). 
332 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(f)(2). 
333 See supra text accompanying notes 134-138. 
334 See supra text accompanying notes 121-123. 
335 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(f)(2). 
336 See supra text accompanying notes 140-144. 
337 See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A). 
338 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(5). 
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be the type of security applicable to an obligation held by an RMBS trust. 
Practices of the mortgage securitization industry in the years leading up to the 
Financial Crisis in general and the use of MERS in particular suggest that RMBS 
trusts often did not hold mortgages or deeds of trust, and they lacked the power to 
enforce them.  
 In downstream litigation, courts in many states have considered who holds 
or controls the legal rights and obligations of mortgage notes and mortgages that 
are designated as RMBS trust property.339 The issues state courts have considered 
with respect to mortgage notes and mortgages include standing to foreclose,340 
entitlement to notice of bankruptcy proceeding against a mortgagor,341 ownership 
of a mortgage note under a state’s commercial code, the right to initiate a 
nonjudicial foreclosure, and liability for recording fees.342 The outcomes of these 
cases vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction depending upon the issue under 
consideration and the facts of a particular case. Many cases pit a borrower against 
one or more banks or MERS. In many cases, the courts rule in favor of the 
borrower, eliminating the rights of the bank to collect on a note or foreclose on 
property; in other cases, courts have found that banks have standing.343  
 The outcome of such cases often turns on whether the bank initiating a 
claim (or on whose behalf another party initiates a claim) holds both the mortgage 
note and the mortgage at the initiation of the claim.344 In some jurisdictions, 
                                                 
339 Litigation in this area is moving quickly, so even work done a few years ago is not up to date. 
Nonetheless, an early article with a nice overview of cases that consider state-law issues 
associated with MERS recording is John R. Hooge & Laurie Williams, Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc.: A Survey of Cases Discussing MERS’ Authority to Act, NORTON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW ADVISOR 1 (Aug. 2010). 
340 See Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, Inc. 175 Wash.2d 83, 285 P.3d 34 (Wash. 2012) 
(holding that MERS was not a beneficiary under Washington Deed of Trust Act because it did not 
hold the mortgage note); Eaton v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 462 Mass. 569 (Mass. 
2012); Ralph v. Met Life Home Loans, No. CV 2010-0200 (5th D. Idaho August 10, 2011) 
(holding that MERS was not the beneficial owner of a deed of trust, so its assignment was a nullity 
and the assignee could not bring a nonjudicial foreclosure against the borrower); Fowler v. 
Recontrust Company, N.A., 2011 WL 839863 (D. Utah March 10, 2011) (holding that MERS is 
the beneficial owner under Utah law); Jackson v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 
770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) (holding that MERS, as nominee, could institute a foreclosure by 
advertisement, i.e., a nonjudicial foreclosure, based upon Minnesota “MERS statute” that allows 
nominee to foreclose). 
341 See Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009) (holding that 
MERS had no interest in the property and was not entitled to notice of bankruptcy or to intervene 
to challenge it). 
342 See Kemp, 440 B.R. 624. 
343 See, REFinBlog.com (indicating that of the cases analyzed through July 20, 2013, courts held 
that MERS or the Bank had standing in 48 and lacked standing in 53) (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
344 See Bradley T. Borden, David J. Reiss & William KeAupuni Akina, Show Me the Note!, 19 
BANK & LENDER LIABILITY 3 (June 3, 2013). 
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courts allow banks to foreclose if they are just the mortgagee, but other 
jurisdictions require banks to have the note to initiate foreclosure.345 Banks in 
every jurisdiction can obtain rights to foreclosure through possession of the 
necessary documents. Because timing of their rights is important for REMIC 
classification, acquisitions of the relevant rights prior to initiating legal 
proceedings may not be sufficient for tax purposes.  
The inability to foreclose on an obligation calls into question whether it 
was secured by real property. REMICs, sponsors, originators, underwriters, and 
their advisors were put on notice as early as 2001 that their positions regarding 
security probably lacked legal support. In 2001, the Attorney General of New 
York concluded that recording a MERS instrument violates New York real 
property law.346 Even though the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in 
New York State) later ruled that the clerk had to record the MERS documents,347 
that ruling put RMBS trustees and other industry participants on notice that 
purported REMICs may not be able to foreclose on mortgage notes that were part 
of a MERS securitization. 
Some commentators claim that an obligation is secured by an interest in 
real property if, after all of the agreements and rights have been enforced, the 
RMBS trust will end up with the collateral real property or proceeds from the sale 
of such property (the ultimate-outcome argument).348 They may argue that the 
originator can transfer possession of the mortgage note and assign the mortgage to 
the purported REMIC before the attempt to enforce the mortgage note through 
payment collection efforts or foreclosure.349 As a general rule, courts typically 
find for a bank that holds the mortgage note and the mortgage prior to 
commencing a foreclosure action, but the outcome is much less predictable where 
the foreclosing party does not hold both instruments when the action 
commences.350 Thus, the possession of the note and ownership of the mortgage 
often affect the rights of an RMBS trust.  
The ultimate-outcome argument does not hold up under scrutiny. The 
REMIC rules provide that an obligation is not principally secured by an interest in 
real property if the obligation’s security is an interest in another obligation.351 The 
fact that the collateral obligation is secured by an interest in real property does not 
affect this analysis.352 Thus, if an RMBS trust holds an obligation from the 
originator, and that obligation is secured by mortgage notes that the originator 
                                                 
345 See generally Whitman & Milner, supra note 244. 
346 See MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 2006). 
347 See id. at 96. 
348 See Peaslee & Nirenberg, supra note 166, at 464–65. 
349 See id.  
350 See generally Whitman & Milner, supra note 244. 
351 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(a)(6). 
352 See id. 
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holds, the RMBS trust’s obligation is not principally secured by an interest in real 
property. This result holds true even if the originator’s mortgage notes are secured 
by interests in real property. Consequently, if an RMBS trust does not own 
mortgage notes for tax purposes, but they do own an obligation from the 
originator secured by the mortgage notes, the obligation that the RMBS trust 
holds will not be principally secured by an interest in real property. This result 
obtains even though the RMBS trust may be able to foreclose on the originator’s 
mortgage notes, gain ownership and possession of them and the mortgage, and 
then foreclose on the underlying real estate. The ultimate outcome of this series of 
events is the RMBS trust gaining the proceeds from the sale of real property, but 
the REMIC rules do not treat the RMBS trust as holding an obligation secured by 
an interest in real property. 
If the ultimate-outcome argument is not effective with respect to 
obligations secured by obligations secured by interests in real property, it should 
not be effective with respect to other obligations that require similar foreclosure 
actions. Thus, the ultimate-outcome argument should not apply to obligations that 
an RMBS trust cannot foreclose upon immediately. If an RMBS trust must take 
actions to compel the originator to transfer the mortgage note and mortgage to 
foreclose on property, the RMBS trust would not appear to own an obligation 
principally secured by an interest in real property. The atrocious state of affairs 
leading up to the Financial Crisis indicates that most RMBS trusts could not 
foreclose on the homes securing the mortgage notes without taking additional 
steps. Such would be similar to those a person would take if the person held an 
obligation secured by another obligation secured by interests in real property. 
Consequently, many RMBS trusts, including the hypothetical second-lien RMBS 
trust, appear not to have held obligations secured by real property. 
The ability to timely foreclose is critical to the underlying purpose of the 
REMIC rules. As stated above, the assets of a REMIC must remain static to 
enable an accurate accounting of the REMIC’s interest income and deductions.353 
The inability to foreclose on the collateral of a loan impedes the static-asset 
objective. If a REMIC can foreclose in a timely manner, it can restore the cash 
flow from the defaulted loan with a new loan or other eligible asset.354 If, 
however, the REMIC must go through numerous additional steps to foreclose, it 
loses a source of cash flow for the period of time it takes to complete those 
additional steps. That loss will affect the computation of income and deduction 
related to the mortgage notes and interests in the REMIC. Thus, the ability to 
foreclose immediately is at the heart of the REMIC rules, and the ultimate-
outcome argument undermines a fundamental purpose of the rules. Consequently, 
                                                 
353 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
354 See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.860G-2(f)(2). 
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courts and the IRS should, and upon careful reflection most likely would, reject 
the ultimate-outcome argument. 
The ultimate-outcome argument links to the timing requirement. The 
argument suggests that an obligation may be secured by an interest in real 
property on the date of acquisition, even if the holder of the obligation is unable to 
enforce the obligation or initiate foreclosure proceedings at that time. In addition 
to ignoring the purposes of the REMIC rules, this point of view appears to 
disregard the timing requirement, which generally requires the RMBS trust to 
hold the secured obligation on the REMIC startup date, but no later than three 
months thereafter.355 The inability to foreclose on a significant portion of the 
mortgage notes on the startup date (or within three months after it) indicates that 
many mortgage notes in RMBS trusts were not secured by interests in real 
property. Because the securitization process using MERS was so inadequate, this 
problem would appear to apply equally to all types of RMBS trusts created in the 
years leading up to the Financial Crisis. 
 
C. Timing Requirement 
 
To satisfy the timing requirement, an RMBS trust must hold qualified 
mortgages on a specific date keyed to the RMBS trust’s formation. Generally, an 
obligation is a qualified mortgage only if the RMBS trust is the tax owner of the 
obligation on the startup date, or if the trust receives it by contribution or within 
three months after the startup date if the RMBS trust purchases it.356 Furthermore, 
an RMBS trust comes within the definition of REMIC only if it holds principally-
secured obligation within three months after the startup date.357 The description 
above of lending and securitization practices reveals that RMBS trusts rarely had 
possession of mortgage notes or were mortgagee of record within three months 
after the startup date, much less on the startup date.358 The parties also appear to 
fail to transfer tax ownership to the RMBS trusts within that time period.359 
Finally, until an RMBS trust is mortgagee of record, and has possession of the 
mortgage note, it will be unable, in some jurisdictions, to foreclose on the real 
property securing the mortgage notes,360 so the loans would not appear to be 
principally secured by an interest in real property within the required time period. 
Thus, even if an RMBS trust takes some steps to cure defects in the securitization 
process after the three-month period expires, such efforts probably would not 
                                                 
355 See I.R.C. §§ 860G(a)(3)(A), 860D(a)(4). 
356 See I.R.C. § 860G(a)(3)(A). 
357 See I.R.C. § 860D(a)(4). 
358 See supra Parts II. B. and C. 
359 See supra Part III. A. 
360 See supra text accompanying notes 4-6. 
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result in the RMBS trust owning an obligation that was principally secured by an 
interest in real property within the required time period. The failure to own 
obligation principally secured by real property within the required time period 
will cause many RMBS trusts to fail the timing requirement. The failure would be 
equally applicable to a trust with second-lien mortgages. 
 
D. Substantially-All Requirement 
 
A trust satisfies the substantially-all requirement only if no more than a de 
minimis amount of the trust’s assets are prohibited assets (i.e., assets that are not 
qualified mortgages or permitted investments).361 A regulatory safe harbor 
provides that an RMBS trust satisfies the substantially-all test if the aggregate 
basis of the prohibited assets is no greater than 1% of the aggregate basis of all of 
the trust’s assets.362 If the aggregate basis of the prohibited assets exceeds the 1% 
threshold, the trust may nonetheless be able to demonstrate that it owns no more 
than a de minimis amount of prohibited assets.363 The regulations provide no 
guidance regarding what a trust must do to demonstrate it owns less than a de 
minimis amount of prohibited assets. Nor do they provide a percentage beyond 
which the amount of prohibited assets would cease to be de minimis. Nonetheless, 
with the 1% safe harbor and the overall tax accounting reasons for granting 
special tax treatment to REMICs,364 a de minimis amount of prohibited assets 
surely cannot exceed a small percentage of an RMBS trust’s total assets. This 
Article illustrates that a significant percentage of the assets of perhaps most 
RMBS trusts would not come within the definition of qualified mortgage, so 
perhaps most RMBS trusts formed in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis 
would have a difficult time meeting the substantially-all requirement. The 
hypothetical second-lien RMBS trust would almost certainly fail the substantially-
all requirement test.  
 A person might argue that if an RMBS trust is not the tax owner of a 
mortgage note, the basis of the note reduces both the numerator and the 
denominator for purposes of applying the substantially-all requirement. This 
theory is unfounded because it does not account for the trust owning some sort of 
asset. Even if an RMBS trust’s assets are not qualified mortgages, an RMBS trust 
holds some type of asset. If an RMBS trust does not own qualified mortgages, the 
nature of the asset it owns will likely depend upon the reason the asset fails to be 
a qualified mortgage. The discussion above illustrates that if an RMBS trust does 
                                                 
361 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3)(i). This article uses “prohibited asset” to refer to any asset 
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362 See Treas. Reg. § 1.860D-1(b)(3)(ii). 
363 See id. 
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not hold qualified mortgages, it could hold a loan from the originator or sponsor. 
Consequently, for purposes of determining the portion of the trust’s assets that are 
prohibited assets, these reclassified assets would be a part of both the numerator 
and denominator. If they are much greater than 1% of the trust’s total assets, the 
trust should not come within the definition of a REMIC. In many situations, they 
would appear to be a significant portion of the trust’s total assets. 
 An example illustrates the application of the substantially-all requirement. 
Suppose an RMBS trust owns $50,000,000 of assets, but because of a failed 
securitization, it is the tax owner of only $35,000,000 of mortgage notes. The 
$15,000,000 balance of its assets could be an obligation from the originator. The 
numerator, for purposes of applying the substantially-all requirement would be 
the $15,000,000 of obligation from the originator, and the denominator would 
include all $50,000,000 of the trust’s assets. The percent of prohibited assets 
would thus be 30% ($15,000,000 divided by $50,000,000). The computation does 
not exclude the $15,000,000 that results from the trust’s failure to be the tax 
owner of the mortgage notes. 
 The discussion to this point has reviewed the state of affairs in the RMBS 
industry in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis. It also demonstrates that 
many RMBS trusts most likely failed to satisfy the REMIC requirements and 
provided the legal basis for challenging REMIC classification. Some RMBS trusts 
would have an almost impossible chance of convincing a court that they satisfied 
the requirements of the REMIC rules. Thus, the Article has presented the legal 
reasons for challenging the REMIC classification of numerous RMBS trusts. The 
next part of this Article presents the policy reasons for challenging the REMIC 
classification of many RMBS trusts. 
 
IV. POLICY REASONS TO ENFORCE REMIC RULES 
 
 At the present, the IRS does not appear to be engaged in auditing REMICs 
or enforcing the REMIC rules. Perhaps their reason for not challenging REMIC 
status at this time is that they are studying the issues; observing the outcome of 
the numerous actions against RMBS trusts, sponsors, and originators; and 
gathering better information to choose the appropriate trusts to challenge. If the 
IRS fails to act, undoubtedly private parties will eventually instigate qui tam or 
whistleblower actions that serve the same policy reasons that should compel IRS 
action. Because REMICs did not file the correct returns and may have committed 
fraud, the statute of limitations for earlier years should remain open 
indefinitely,365 giving the IRS and other parties adequate time to pursue REMIC 
                                                 
365 See I.R.C. § 6501(c)(2) (providing that the statute of limitations remains open indefinitely if a 
return is fraudulent); I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3) (providing that the statute of limitations remains open 
indefinitely if no return is filed). But see I.R.C. § 6501(g)(1) (providing that the statute of 
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litigation after it obtains the information it needs. Ultimately, the IRS should, 
however, take action against the parties that made a mockery of the tax system. 
The IRS’s failure to do so deprives the government of significant tax revenue, 
tacitly sanctions illegal behavior, cedes control of tax enforcement decision-
making to private industry, disregards Congressional mandate, and relieves the 
tax bar of its obligation to help protect the tax system and prudently counsel 
RMBS sponsors and trustees. 
 The private-label RMBS industry is huge. At its peak in 2007 there was 
$2.2 trillion dollars in outstanding securities.366 The amount of interest payments 
that changes hands on $2.2 trillion of RMBS is astronomical. At just 4%, the 
annual interest on the RMBS alone would be $88 billion. The REMIC rules 
ensure that RMBS investors and RMBS trustees properly account for that interest 
and pay tax on it. RMBS sponsors’ failure to properly create REMICs caused 
them to be unable to account for interest inflow and interest outflow. As a 
consequence, they most likely failed to report income due to the federal 
government, depriving it of billions of dollars of tax revenue. 
 To illustrate, by overstating the value of mortgage notes, the parties to 
RMBS trusts understated the interest rates on the notes. Because of the lack of 
sufficient collateral securing a mortgage note and borrowers’ lack of qualification, 
mortgage notes were worth much less than their stated value. The stated interest 
of the note would therefore be much less than the actual interest. For example, if 
the face value of a mortgage note was $100,000 and the stated interest was 5%, 
the borrower would pay $5,000 of interest on the note. If, however, the actual 
value of the mortgage note was $80,000, the $5,000 payment would represent a 
6.25% interest rate. An RMBS trust that reported interest income using the 5% 
rate would underreport income. If the interest deductions were otherwise 
appropriate, the RMBS trust would therefore understate its taxable income. 
Additionally, the inability to maintain a static asset pool with the types of assets 
entering RMBS trusts and their poor quality would result in a miscalculation of 
phantom income, further depriving the government of tax revenues.367 
 The IRS’s lack of enforcement activity in this area prior to the Financial 
Crisis contributed to the magnitude of the crash.368 If the IRS had been active 
auditing RMBS trusts, it would have recognized the inadequacies of the 
                                                                                                                                     
limitations does not remain open indefinitely if a tax corporation, in good faith, files a trust 
return). 
366Matthew Goldstein, The Amazing Shrinking Pile of Non-Agency Mortgage Debt, REUTERS, 
(Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://blogs.reuters.com/unstructuredfinance/2013/03/08/the-amazing-
shrinking-pile-of-non-agency-mortgage-debt/.  
367 See supra note 43. 
368 See Bradley T. Borden, Did the IRS Cause the Financial Crisis?, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 18, 
2012), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bradley-t-borden/did-the-irs-cause-the-
fin_b_1972207.html. 
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securitization process, the poor quality of mortgage notes being securitized, and 
the lack of effort to cure defective mortgage notes. Enforcement would have 
presented RMBS sponsors not only with the prospect of losing favorable tax 
classification for the multiple-tranche RMBS products, but also would have 
threatened to expose their misdeeds to otherwise unsuspecting investors. 
Exposure of those matters would have spelled the end of the demand for shoddy 
RMBS products, and that potential would have placed sufficient market pressure 
on RMBS organizers and loan originators to clean up their acts. Thus, the IRS 
could have helped deter the Financial Crisis. Its continued failure to enforce 
REMIC rules empowers RMBS organizers and loan originators to repeat their 
actions using REMIC classification as a front for their illegal actions. 
The IRS has been slow to take action to help enforce the REMIC rules and 
clean up the RMBS industry. Instead, actions it has taken have benefitted many of 
the parties who caused the Financial Crisis. On December 6, 2007, the IRS 
released revenue Procedure 2007-72, which said “it would not view loan 
modifications specifically made under these guidelines [framework to fend off 
foreclosure of subprime mortgages] as grounds to challenge the tax benefits held 
by REMICS . . .”369 In October 2009, the IRS provided a degree of flexibility for 
CRE loans held in a REMIC. This was later followed by federal bank regulators 
encouraging lenders not to foreclose on delinquent CRE borrowers because of the 
economic downturn.370 The IRS announced on August 17, 2010 that it will not 
challenge the ability of REMICs “to claim certain loans as ‘qualified mortgages’ 
even if they no longer meet the specific requirements of such loans under tax code 
Section 860.”371 These IRS actions are not directed at the heart of the problem and 
appear to accommodate the parties who caused the Financial Crisis. 
 At least one commentator worries that taxing REMICs will unduly harm 
investors.372 The sponsors’ failure to adequately structure REMICs, not 
enforcement of the laws, has harmed investors. Their failure to structure the 
arrangements to obtain favorable tax treatment also harms the investors because 
the tax exposure reduces the value of the REMIC interests. Investors should be 
able to recover that lost value from the sponsors, so the tax burden, which 
represents revenue properly belonging to U.S. taxpayers, should fall upon the 
                                                 
369 Alison Bennett, IRS Reassures REMICs It Will Not Challenge Tax Status if Subprime Loans 
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wrongdoers who organized these shams and misrepresented their quality to 
investors. Furthermore, the IRS may be able to impose transferee liability on 
sponsors, who transferred mortgage notes worth far less than the consideration 
received, and collect any taxes and penalties not covered by the value of RMBS 
trusts’ assets. 
 The IRS’s unwillingness to enforce the REMIC rules cedes control to 
private industry, and private industry knows that and abuses its position of power. 
As one commentator astutely noted, “They take aggressive positions, and they 
figure that if enough of them take an aggressive position, and there’s billions of 
dollars at stake, then the IRS is kind of estopped from arguing with them because 
so much would blow up. And that is called the Wall Street Rule. That is literally 
the nickname for it.”373 Industry experts who appeared to make rules as they went 
along now invoke the Wall Street Rule. For example, an author of the leading 
REMIC treatise “said that even if the IRS finds wrongdoing, it may be loath to act 
because the wide financial damage the penalties would cause.”374 Such patent 
recognition of IRS impotence is frightening and threatens to not only undermine 
the tax system but also the already tenuous ideal of treating taxpayers equally. 
The IRS should not cede control to private parties. If the IRS had performed its 
audit function in the years leading up to the Financial Crisis, it could have helped 
prevent the problem in the first place and would not have to take action now that 
some perceive could potentially cause financial damage. 
 If the concern is that enforcement action at this time will cause wide 
financial damage, this Article should help alleviate that concern. The IRS could 
focus on low-hanging fruit: namely, second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts that 
claimed to be REMICs. Second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts formed in the years 
leading up to the Financial Crisis almost certainly will not satisfy the REMIC 
requirements. Thus, proving the case against them will be very possible for the 
IRS. Also, second-lien mortgage RMBS issuances were comparatively small, with 
about $60 billion in 2005.375 Financial damage to the world economy will not 
result from challenging the tax classification of second-lien mortgage RMBS 
trusts. The trusts will owe taxes and penalties, and the parties will have to 
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determine the ultimate liability for those taxes and penalties. Under a transference 
liability theory, that liability could rest with the RMBS sponsors or loan 
originators—those parties most responsible for the Financial Crisis. Courts can 
work that out. 
 After pursuing second-lien mortgage RMBS trusts, the IRS could evaluate 
the results and decide whether they should make the case with respect to other 
types of RMBS trusts and pursue further action against them. IRS enforcement, 
even with respect to a portion of the RMBS market, will help the IRS develop 
further expertise in this area and enable it to use the expertise to develop better 
audit and enforcement practices. The IRS could use those improved skills to help 
prevent a catastrophe similar to the one that caused the Financial Crisis. 
Enforcement would also reestablish the IRS as the police power in this area, and 
take that function back from Wall Street. Enforcement in this area would also 
bring other viewpoints and voices to lawmaking in this area. 
 The IRS’s inaction also damages the tax system in a more general way. 
The tax bar has traditionally accepted some responsibility for upholding the 
integrity of the tax system. Members of the bar do this by ensuring that advice 
they give reflects the highest standards and that they do not participate in 
transactions that violate the law. This Article illustrates that a significant 
percentage of RMBS trusts probably do not satisfy the REMIC requirements, but 
RMBS organizers treated them as REMICs. Some RMBS trusts appear to have 
almost no chance of satisfying the requirements. Nonetheless, “will” tax opinion 
letters accompanied the RMBS offering materials. A will opinion is the authors’ 
assurance that the RMBS trust has a 95% chance of prevailing on the merits 
should the IRS challenge the classification.376 The authors of the opinions qualify 
them by providing that they are reliable only if the securitization occurs as 
described in the offering materials.377 Despite that qualifier, the opinion authors 
should be accountable for their inaccurate opinions to the extent that they were 
aware of the RMBS problems. As industry participants who were close to the 
action, they had to know about many of the problems that existed.378 Because of 
the Wall Street Rule and IRS inaction, they continued to issue unsupported 
opinions. If the IRS does not enforce the REMIC rules, however, members of the 
bar arguably will feel no greater obligation to abide by the rules. IRS failure to 
enforce the rules gives implicit license to the tax bar to ignore the rules. 
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Consequently, the IRS’s inaction causes exponential damage to the tax system as 
a whole. 
 Finally, IRS inaction is an affront to the Congressional action that grants 
favorable tax treatment to only certain types of RMBS trusts that satisfy very 
specific rules. This offends many commentators, who believe that the IRS should 
not exercise such discretion, but should enforce the laws as created by 
Congress.379 Furthermore, the detailed rules in the REMIC regime address very 
specific purposes,380 and a failure to enforce them undermines those purposes. 
Consequently, very significant policy supports the IRS challenging REMIC 
classification of at least some RMBS trusts. If the IRS fails to take action, it must 
accept responsibility for the financial harm that results from such inaction. 
  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The issue of REMIC failure is important in at least four contexts: (1) in 
any potential effort by the IRS to clean up this industry and collect tax and 
penalties from organizations that did not satisfy the REMIC requirements; (2) in 
civil lawsuits brought by REMIC investors against sponsors, underwriters, and 
other parties who pooled mortgages and sold mortgage-backed securities; (3) to 
state and federal prosecutors who may consider bringing criminal or civil fraud 
claims against sponsors, underwriters, and other parties who pooled mortgages 
and sold RMBS; and (4) to private parties who know of specific abuse and may 
bring qui tam or whistleblower action against purported REMICs. This Article 
provides a roadmap for pursuing tax enforcement action against RMBS trusts. 
The Article illustrates that many RMBS trusts, perhaps the majority of them, 
leading up to the Financial Crisis could not satisfy the REMIC requirements. 
Instead of advocating action against all such trusts, however, the Article 
recommends that the IRS should consider bringing action against RMBS trusts 
that clearly fail to satisfy the REMIC requirements. A logical starting point would 
therefore be an examination of RMBS trusts comprised of second-lien mortgage 
notes. Findings and results of such actions would help inform the IRS about 
whether it should expand the scope of its efforts. Both the law and policy support 
such action, so continued inaction is unacceptable. 
 
                                                 
379 See, e.g.,Yves Smith, IRS Likely to Expand Mortgage Industry Coverup by Whitewashing 
REMIC Violations, NAKED CAPITALISM (Apr. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/04/irs-likely-to-expand-mortgage-industry-coverup-by-
whitewashing-remic-violations.html#sdR8UXJzAHLIllVG.99. 
380 See supra text accompanying notes 40-44. 
